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ABSTRACT 
 
 From Martin Frobisher in 1576 to John Franklin in 1845, 
generations of European explorers searched for a navigable 
route through the Arctic islands to Asia.  Their greatest 
challenge was sea-ice, which has almost always filled the 
straits, even in summer.  Climate change, however, is 
fundamentally altering the sea-ice conditions: In September 
2007, the Northwest Passage was ice-free for the first time in 
recorded history.  This Article reviews the consequences of this 
development, particularly in terms of the security and 
environmental risks that would result from international 
shipping along North America’s longest coast.  It analyzes the 
differing positions of Canada and the United States with respect 
to the legal status of the waterway and argues that the end of 
the Cold War and the rise of global terrorism have changed the 
situation in such a way that the Canadian position—that the 
Northwest Passage constitutes Canadian internal waters subject 
to the full force of Canadian domestic law—actually coincides 
with U.S. interests today, as well as the interests of other 
responsible countries and shipping companies. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 “Where has all the ice gone?” Joe Immaroitok asked.1  It was 
October 24, 2006, and he was staring at Foxe Basin.  A shallow 
expanse of ocean the size of Lake Superior, the basin usually freezes 
over by early October, enabling the Inuit to travel across to Baffin 
Island to hunt caribou.  That winter, the town council in Igloolik was 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Interview with Joe Immaroitok, Member, Hamlet Council of Igloolik, 
Nunavut, Can. (Oct. 24, 2006) (on file with authors). 
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considering chartering an airplane to take the hunters across the 
unfrozen sea.2 
 A few hours before we spoke with Immaroitok, we had sailed 
through Fury and Hecla Strait on board the CCGS Amundsen, 
Canada’s research icebreaker.  All we saw were a few chunks of thick, 
aquamarine “multiyear” ice—formed when ice survives one or more 
summers and new ice accretes to it.  The chunks, which had floated 
down from higher latitudes, were easily avoided.  The previous day, 
we had passed through Bellot Strait—the first ship ever to do so in 
October.  We were 350 miles north of the Arctic Circle, but there was 
no ice. 
 The two straits are part of the Northwest Passage, the so-called 
“Arctic Grail.”3  From Martin Frobisher in 1576 to John Franklin in 
1845, generations of European explorers searched for a navigable 
route through the Arctic islands to Asia.4  Many of them—including 
Franklin and his men—died in the attempt.5  Their greatest 
challenge was sea-ice, which has almost always filled the straits, even 
in summer.  William Parry spent the summers of 1822 and 1823 
waiting for the ice to clear from Fury and Hecla Strait.6  Although the 
strait is named after his ships, he never made it through.7  Leopold 
M’Clintock, dispatched by Lady Franklin to search for her husband 
on King William Island, tried six times to penetrate Bellot Strait 
during the summer of 1858 before continuing his journey by dog-
sled.8   It took Roald Amundsen three years—including two winters 
lodged in the ice at Gjoa Harbour—to complete the first full transit of 
the Northwest Passage in 1906.9 
 In 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment reported that the 
average extent of sea-ice cover in summer had declined by 15%–20% 
over the previous thirty years.10  The remaining ice was 10%-15% 
thinner overall and 40% thinner in some areas.11  These trends were 
                                                                                                                      
 2. Id.  
 3. This expression was coined in PIERRE BERTON, THE ARCTIC GRAIL: THE 
QUEST FOR THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE AND THE NORTH POLE, 1818–1909 (1988). 
 4. On the history of the Northwest Passage, see generally id.; JAMES P. 
DELGADO, ACROSS THE TOP OF THE WORLD (1999). 
 5. BERTON, supra note 3, at 263–69. 
 6. Id. at 51. 
 7. Id. at 45–52, 58–59. 
 8. Id. at 321–22. 
 9. Id. at 543–47. 
 10. IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 25 
(2004), available at http://amap.no/acia/ [hereinafter ACIA]. The ACIA is a joint project 
of the Arctic Council and the International Arctic Science Committee, the former an 
intergovernmental network whose members include Canada, the U.S. and Russia. Id. 
at 1.  
 11. Id. at 25. 
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expected to accelerate such that by the end of the twenty-first 
century, there might be no sea-ice at all in the summer.12  
 Satellite measurements analyzed by the U.S. National Snow and 
Ice Data Center are even more alarming.13  In March 2006, the area 
covered during the winter by sea-ice was at an all-time low: 300,000 
square kilometers less than the previous year.14  At this rate, the 
Arctic could lose all of its multi-year ice by 2030.15  In September 
2007, the European Space Agency released satellite imagery showing 
that the ice-covered area in the Arctic had dropped to around 3 
million square kilometers, roughly 1 million square kilometers less 
than the previous minimums recorded in 2005 and 2006.16  The 2007 
ice loss was approximately ten times greater that the average annual 
reduction over the previous ten years.17  As Leif Toudal Pedersen of 
the Danish National Space Centre explained, “[t]he strong reduction 
in just one year certainly raises flags that the ice (in summer) may 
disappear much sooner than expected and that we urgently need to 
understand better the processes involved.”18  
 The satellite images showed that the Northwest Passage was 
fully navigable.19  This remarkable—and remarkably sudden—
development is something that policy makers simply cannot ignore.  
This Article reviews the consequences of the rapidly changing sea-ice 
conditions in the Northwest Passage, especially in terms of the 
security and environmental risks that would result from 
international shipping there.  It analyzes the differing positions of 
Canada and the United States with respect to the legal status of the 
waterway and considers how those positions might facilitate or 
hinder efforts to deal with the new security and environmental 
                                                                                                                      
 12. Id. at 13.  
 13. David Adam, Meltdown Fear as Arctic Ice Cover Falls to Record Winter 
Low, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 15, 2006, at 12, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/may/15/antarctica.environment; Jane George, 
Welcome to the Final Meltdown, NUNATSIAQ NEWS (Iqaluit, Nunavik, Can.), May 26, 
2006, http://nunatsiaqnews.com/archives/60526/news/climate/60526_03.html.  
 14. Adam, supra note 13, at 12. 
 15. Id.; see also Steve Connor, Scientists Warn Arctic Sea Ice is Melting at its 
Fastest Rate Since Records Began, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 15, 2007, 
available at http://news.independent.co.uk/sci_tech/article2864214.ece (discussing the 
rate at which the arctic sea ice is melting). 
 16. Satellites Witness Lowest Arctic Ice Coverage in History, EUROPEAN SPACE 
AGENCY, Sept. 14, 2007, available at http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMYTC13J6F_ 
index_0.html. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. The Passage opened again in the summer of 2008. Post of David Biello 
to 60 Second Science: Scientific American News Blog, Fabled Northwest Passage Open 
for Business in the Arctic, http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/60-second-
science/post.cfm?id=fabled-northwest-passage-open-for-b-2008-08-27 (Aug. 27, 2008, 
15:24 EST).  
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concerns.  The Article argues that the end of the Cold War and the 
rise of global terrorism have changed the situation in such a way that 
the Canadian position—that the Northwest Passage constitutes 
Canadian internal waters subject to the full force of Canadian 
domestic law—actually coincides with U.S. interests today and the 
interests of other responsible countries and shipping companies.  As a 
result, the two countries have a unique opportunity—not just to 
resolve a longstanding dispute but also to cooperate in protecting the 
security and environment of the continent and planet on which they 
exist. 
 We recognize that the United States will not easily be persuaded 
that Canadian control over the Northwest Passage serves its 
interests.  Consequently, Part XI of this Article sets out a number of 
intermediate steps—identified through a model negotiation involving 
teams of U.S. and Canadian non-governmental experts—that the two 
countries could take to address their common concerns with respect 
to Northern shipping.  These steps, which make sense in-and-of 
themselves, would build confidence in Canada’s commitment to 
developing the Northwest Passage as a safe and efficient waterway 
for everyone’s benefit. 
II.  CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING 
 Canada’s High Arctic is a vast archipelago made up of about 
19,000 islands and countless rocks and reefs.20  Baffin Island is larger 
than Britain,21 while Ellesmere and Victoria Islands are nearly as 
large.22  Between the islands lie a number of possible shipping routes 
connecting the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans (and later the Pacific 
Ocean), with the widest and deepest route running from Lancaster 
Sound through Barrow Strait into Viscount Melville Sound and 
                                                                                                                      
 20. DONAT PHARAND, CANADA’S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 
(1988). 
 21. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-
9116318/Largest-Islands-of-the-World (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (entry for “Island”). 
Baffin Island, in the territory of Nunavut, is the world’s fifth largest island at 195,928 
square miles. Id. At 84,400 square miles, the island of Great Britain is the largest of 
the British Isles and the eighth largest in the world. Id.  
 22. Id. Ellesmere Island, in the territory of Nunavut, is the most northerly of 
the Canadian Arctic islands and the world’s tenth largest island with an area of 75,767 
square miles. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ 
topic/185000/Ellesmere-Island (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (entry for “Ellesmere Island”). 
Straddling the boundary between Nunavut and the Northwest Territories of Canada, 
Victoria Island is the ninth largest island in the world with an area of 83,897 square 
miles. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
627741/Victoria-Island (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (entry for “Victoria Island”). 
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onwards through M’Clure Strait into the Beaufort Sea.23  A 
modification of this route diverts southwest from Viscount Melville 
Sound through the relatively narrow but deep Prince of Wales 
Strait.24  Historically, severe ice conditions in M’Clure Strait and 
Viscount Melville Sound have forced explorers, adventurers, and 
Coast Guard icebreakers to take a combination of more southerly 
routes, all of which exit into the Beaufort Sea through Coronation 
Gulf and Amundsen Gulf, to the south of Victoria and Banks 
Islands.25  But history is little guide for what is now happening in the 
North. 
 It has long been assumed that these more southerly straits and 
channels are too narrow, shallow, and subject to strong currents to 
provide a viable route for larger commercial vessels.26  However, 
underwater mapping conducted from the CCGS Amundsen suggests 
the contrary: With the ice gone, even chokepoints such as Bellot 
Strait or Fury and Hecla Strait should pose no more of an 
impediment to navigation that the Bosporus or Dardanelles.27  From 
our own anecdotal observations, an experienced navigator could 
already take a large container ship or tanker through the straits in 
late summer or early fall.  It seems inevitable that the deeper, wider 
routes further north will eventually open as well, as even M’Clure 
Strait briefly did in September 2007 and again in September 2008.  
Once free of ice, these routes could accommodate the largest of ocean-
going vessels, including massive supertankers. 
 At the same time, there are many complicating factors, including 
the Arctic Oscillation.  This circular pattern of atmospheric winds 
and ocean currents has already pushed the Arctic Ocean’s shrinking 
icepack away from the Russian coast, leaving it seasonally ice-free.28  
On the other side of the Arctic Ocean, the pack remains flush against 
the northwest flank of the Canadian archipelago, with most of the ice 
being “multi-year ice,” which can be more than twenty feet thick and 
                                                                                                                      
 23. PHARAND, supra note 20, at 194–95, 201. 
 24. Id. at 201. 
 25. See id. at 189–201 (describing the main routes of the Northwest Passage).  
 26. PHARAND, supra note 20, at 201 
 27. See generally Ocean Mapping Group, OMG in ArcticNet, 
http://www.omg.unb.ca/Projects/Arctic/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (describing 
the Canadian Arctic Shelf Exchange Study which studies the effects of ice sea 
variability in the Arctic). 
 28. ACIA, supra note 10, at 83. The Russian government is promoting those 
waters—the Northern Sea Route (NSR)—for shipping between Asia and Europe. 
According to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, “for trans-Arctic voyages, the NSR 
represents up to a 40% savings in distance from northern Europe to northeast Asia and 
the northwest coast of North America compared to southerly routes via the Suez or 
Panama Canals.” ACIA, supra note 10, at 83. However, a number of factors—ranging 
from still unpredictable ice conditions to run-down Siberian ports to high transit fees—
have discouraged shipping companies from using the route so far.   
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nearly as hard as concrete due to seasonal accretion of new ice and 
the gradual leaching out of sea salt.29 
A. Climate Change, Science, and Sea-ice 
 For some time, scientists have differed in their assessments of 
the likely effects of rising temperatures on ice conditions between 
Canada’s northern islands.  Some have predicted that ice conditions 
will become worse for shipping, at least for the next few decades.  As 
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment noted: 
[R]esults of research at Canada’s Institute of Ocean Sciences suggest 
that the amount of multi-year sea ice moving into the Northwest 
Passage is controlled by blockages or “ice bridges” in the northern 
channels and straits of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. With a 
warmer arctic climate leading to higher temperatures and a longer melt 
season, these bridges are likely to be more easily weakened (and likely 
to be maintained for a shorter period of time each winter) and the 
flushing or movement of ice through the channels and straits could 
become more frequent. More multi-year ice and potentially many more 
                                                                                                                      
 29. ACIA, supra note 10, at 24. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment provides 
a very useful “ice primer”:   
Sea-ice is formed as seawater freezes. Because sea-ice is less dense than 
seawater, it floats on top of the ocean. As sea-ice forms, it rejects the majority of 
its salt to the ocean, making the ice even lighter. Because sea-ice is formed 
from existing sea water, its melting does not raise the sea level. Fast ice (or 
landfast ice) is sea-ice that grows from the coast into the sea, remaining 
attached to the coast or grounded to a shallow sea floor. It is important as a 
resting, hunting, and migration platform for species such as polar bears and 
walrus. It largely disappears during the summer months (July to October). 
Pack ice refers to a large area of floating sea-ice fragments that are packed 
together. Ice caps and glaciers are land-based ice, with ice caps “capping” hills 
and mountains and glaciers usually referring to the ice filling the valleys, 
although the term glacier is often used to refer to ice caps as well. An ice sheet 
is a collection of ice caps and glaciers, such as currently found on Greenland 
and Antarctica. When ice caps, glaciers, and ice sheets melt, they cause the sea 
level to rise by adding to the amount of water in the oceans. An iceberg is a 
chunk of ice that calves off a glacier or ice sheet and floats at the ocean surface. 
Id.   
 Other common “ice” terms include shelf ice which is an extension of glacial ice into 
coastal waters that is in contact with the bottom near the shore but not toward the 
edge of the shelf. Though permanent, it is not entirely stable and at particular times of 
the year, the edge of the shelf can break off creating floating islands of ice. Multiyear 
ice is the thicker sea-ice that has survived at least one summer melt season. In order 
for the volume of Arctic sea-ice to stay roughly the same from year to year, the 
multiyear ice that leaves the Arctic—whether pushed by winds or ocean currents or 
succumbing to summer melt—must be replenished by first-year ice that grows in 
winter and survives the summer. 
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icebergs could thus move into the marine routes of the Northwest 
Passage, presenting additional hazards to navigation.30 
The Canadian Ice Service, for its part, has predicted significant 
yearly variability in sea-ice conditions, even if the Arctic region as a 
whole experiences an overall reduction in sea-ice extent.31  This 
would make regular navigation along the Northwest Passage difficult 
and unattractive for the next few decades.32 
 Other scientists believe that, as the Arctic Ocean icepack 
retreats northward, less multi-year ice will make it into the 
Northwest Passage.  Historically, multi-year ice from the Arctic 
Ocean has been pushed into M’Clure Strait at the western end of the 
Passage, stymieing even the SS Manhattan, a 1,005-foot long ice-
strengthened super-tanker that attempted in 1969 to break through 
M’Clure Strait accompanied by two icebreakers.33 Yet the southern 
edge of the icepack is retreating inexorably northwards.34  As soon as 
it retreats beyond the northern edge of M’Clure Strait, the Northwest 
Passage could be covered primarily with thinner, softer “single-year 
ice,” which breaks up in late summer and poses little impediment to 
ice-strengthened vessels. 
 There is the possibility that the multi-year ice might soon 
disappear completely.  In December 2007, Professor Wieslaw 
Maslowski of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School told the American 
Geophysical Union that a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean was 
                                                                                                                      
 30. Id. at 84–85.  
 31. Id. at 84.  
 32. See, e.g., K.J. Wilson et al., Shipping in the Canadian Arctic: Other Possible 
Climate Change Scenarios, in 3 INTERNATIONAL GEOSCIENCE AND REMOTE SENSING 
SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 1856 (IEEE International ed., 2004), available at 
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/KW_IGARSS04_NWP.pdf. 
The GCM’s [Global Climate Models] predicting an ice-free Arctic by the middle 
of this century may lead many into a false sense of optimism regarding the ease 
of future shipping in the Canadian Arctic. Sea ice conditions are highly variable 
and there will still be summers of occasional heavy ice conditions. Studies 
using the CIS [Canadian Ice Service] digital ice chart archive are indicating a 
reduction in FYI [First Year Ice] in the QEI [Queen Elizabeth Islands] allowing 
more OI [Old Ice] to reach the NWP [Northwest Passage] and a southern shift 
in the Beaufort Sea pack ice. Future navigation in the NWP may see a blockage 
of the western NWP routes by the southern shift in pack ice and an increase in 
drifting OI creating choke points in narrow channels and significant navigation 
hazards. 
Id. 
 33. See discussion, infra Part III.A. 
 34. David Barber et al., The Incredible Shrinking Sea Ice, POLICY OPTIONS, 
Dec. 2005–Jan. 2006, at 67, available at http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/dec05/ 
barber.pdf. 
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possible as early as 2013.35  The prediction was obtained by adding 
the factor of heat carried by ocean water into models based on data 
from 1979-2004.36  The seasonal melting of all the sea-ice would spell 
the end of multi-year ice, the principal shipping hazard, thus 
enabling ice-strengthened cargo ships to operate in the Northwest 
Passage throughout the year.  This radical transformation of ice 
conditions in the Arctic is also discussed in the 2009 Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment (AMSA) Report drafted by the PAME working 
group of the Arctic Council.  The Report states that “[t]here is a 
possibility of an ice-free Arctic Ocean for a short period in summer 
perhaps as early as 2015. This would mean the disappearance of 
multi-year ice, as no sea ice will survive the summer melt season.”37 
 While short-term predictions vary, nearly all scientists agree 
that by mid-century the Northwest Passage will be navigable by 
regular ships for at least part of the year. Governments have been 
warned to expect an open waterway well before then.  In 2001, a 
report prepared for the U.S. Navy predicted that, “within 5-10 years, 
the Northwest Passage will be open to non-ice-strengthened vessels 
for at least one month each summer.”38  For many, an ice-free 
Northwest Passage is, therefore, only a question of time, and while 
science aims to establish certainty, good public policy is frequently 
based on analyses of risk.  If there is even a 20% chance that the 
Passage will be safely navigable for regular cargo vessels within the 
next few decades, policymakers should be moving quickly to prepare 
for that eventuality. 
B. Why Ships Will Come 
 There is little doubt that the Northwest Passage will become 
attractive to foreign shipping, for it offers a route between East Asia 
and the Atlantic seaboard that is 4000 miles shorter than the current 
route through the Panama Canal—saving time, fuel, and transit 
fees.39  It could also accommodate super-tankers and container ships 
that are too large for the Canal.40  In the near term, uncertainties 
                                                                                                                      
 35. Jonathan Amos, Arctic Summers Ice-Free ‘By 2013,’ B.B.C. (San Francisco), 
Dec. 12, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7139797.stm.   
 36. Id.  
 37. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT 4 
(2009), available at http://pame.arcticportal.org/images/stories/PDF_Files/AMSA_2009_ 
Report_2nd_ print.pdf. 
 38. OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  NAVAL OPERATIONS IN AN ICE-FREE ARCTIC 
2 (2001), http://www.natice.noaa.gov/icefree/Arcticscenario.pdf. 
 39. ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 44. 
 40. See David Usborne, Path Between The Oceans: Tide Turns Against the 
Panama Canal, THE INDEPENDENT (London), April 26, 2006, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/path-between-the-oceans-tide-
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about the weather, availability of search and rescue, and movement 
of multiyear ice, along with higher insurance premiums, will likely 
dissuade reputable international shipping companies from using the 
Northwest Passage.  However, less solvent and reputable companies 
might take the risk, raising the prospect that some of the least safe 
vessels on the oceans might actually be the first to use the 
waterway.41 
 Franklyn Griffiths argues that ships are more likely to go 
straight across the Arctic Ocean to the north of Canadian territory.42  
This is probably accurate for voyages between Asia and Europe or 
between the west coast of North America and Europe, but going 
around Greenland adds more than 1000 miles to voyages to or from 
the east coast of North America. 
 Three or four foreign cruise ships already traverse the Passage 
each summer.43  In August 2008, a Danish cable laying ship, the M/V 
Peter Faber, needed to move from a project near Taiwan to another 
project between Newfoundland and Greenland.44  The captain chose 
the Northwest Passage, sailing through without incident or fanfare.45  
The deepwater route of the Northwest Passage can also accommodate 
super-tankers and container ships that are too large for the Panama 
Canal.  More and more ships are being built that exceed the 
“Panamax” dimensions of 294 meters by 32 meters with a maximum 
draft of 12 meters (giving rise to a displacement of around 65,000 
tons).46 The relatively calm waters within the Archipelago will also be 
attractive.  In 1999, a massive Russian dry dock was towed to the 
Bahamas through the Northwest Passage in order to reduce its 
exposure to ocean storms.47 
                                                                                                                      
turns-against-the-panama-canal-475669.html (discussing how some ships are too big 
for the Panama Canal).  
 41. Rob Huebert, The Shipping News Part II: How Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty 
is on Thinning Ice, 58 INT’L J. 295, 302 (2003). Huebert warns of the “danger posed by 
smaller and, possibly, more risk-oriented shipping companies” of which there is an 
“alarmingly high number whose past actions have demonstrated that they are willing 
to take dangerous chances with ship safety in the pursuit of profit.” Id.  
 42. Franklyn Griffiths, Canadian Arctic Sovereignty: Time to Take Yes for an 
Answer on the Northwest Passage, in NORTHERN EXPOSURE: PEOPLES, POWERS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR CANADA’S NORTH 1, 14–15 (Frances Abele et al. eds., 2009), available at 
http://www.irpp.org/books/archive/AOTS4/griffiths.pdf. 
 43. ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 78–80. 
 44. Capers and Capabilities—While Canadian Leaders Talk About Arctic 
Sovereignty, Vessels from other Nations Cut Through Arctic Waters, CAN.-AM. 
STRATEGIC REV., Aug. 29, 2008, http://www.casr.ca/as-arctic-sovereignty-capabilities-
1.htm.  
 45. Id.  
 46. ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 72. 
 47. Huebert, supra note 41, at 304–05; Alanna Mitchell, The Northwest 
Passage Thawed, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 5, 2000, at A11. 
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 More shipping is also being generated by the increased 
commercial activity in Canada’s Arctic.  In 2007, mining companies 
spent $330 million in Nunavut in pursuit of gold, diamonds, uranium, 
and other minerals.48  On northern Baffin Island, the Mary River 
iron-ore mine is under development and already has hundreds of 
employees.49  With 365 million tons of proven and probable reserves, 
it is projected to produce 18 million tons per year for the next quarter 
of a century.50  The high quality ore will be shipped directly to Europe 
on a fleet of 300 meter-long ice-strengthened ships purpose-built in 
Finland and capable of operating in Foxe Basin, Nunavut, throughout 
the year.51  
 In the mineral-rich Kitikmeot region of western Nunavut, six 
mining companies—including giants Rio Tinto and De Beers—have 
joined together in support of the Bathurst Inlet Port and Road 
Project.52  The proposed port would be able to accommodate ships as 
large as 25,000 tons.53  Linked to a 211 kilometer all-weather road, it 
would enable the companies to bring heavy equipment into their 
mines and ship the extracted ore out to the market.54  It would also 
increase traffic in the Northwest Passage since Bathurst Inlet is on 
Coronation Gulf, which is part of the southern route of the 
waterway.55 
 In September 2008, the MV Camilla Desgagnés, an ice-
strengthened cargo ship, made a scheduled resupply run from 
                                                                                                                      
 48. Number of Nunavut Prospecting Permits Drops This Year, CAN. 
BROADCASTING CENTRE., Feb. 3, 2009,  available at  http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/ 
story/2009/02/03/nunavut-permits.html.  
 49. Andy Hoffman, Baffinland Confirms Vast Iron Ore Play, GLOBE & MAIL 
(Toronto), Feb. 20, 2008 at B.5; Interview with Arthur Yan (Legal Coordinator) and 
Other Officials at Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., in Iqaluit, Can. (Feb. 20, 2008). 
 50. Hoffman, supra note 49, at B.5. 
 51. BAFFINLAND IRON MINES CORP., DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL FOR THE MARY 
RIVER PROJECT 57–58, 60 (2008) (discussing shipping and operations); Arctic-Class 
Capesize Ships, THE FEDNAV CURRENT (Montreal, Can.), Dec. 2007, at 1, 
http://www.fednav.com/anglais/the_fednav_current.html (describing details of the 
ships). 
 52. See Bathurst Inlet Port and Road Venture (BIPR) Project, 
http://www.nunalogistics.com/projects/clients/bathurst/index.html (last visited Oct. 16, 
2009) (showing a client list for the project). 
 53. Bob Weber, Arctic Port Gathers Steam, TORONTO STAR, July 4, 2007, 
available at http://www.thestar.com/Business/article/232201. 
 54. Bathurst Inlet Port and Road Venture (BIPR) Project, supra note 52. 
 55. ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 20–21 (describing Coronation Gulf as a 
favorable transit route). For a map showing the location of Bathurst Inlet within 
Coronation Gulf and a discussions of the environmental effects of the Bathurst Inlet 
Port and Road Project, see Hadi Dowlatabadi et al., Bridging the Gap Between Project-
Level Assessments and Regional Development Dynamics: A Methodology for Estimating 
Cumulative Effects, in RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MONOGRAPH SERIES 2003 § 3.1, 
fig.6, http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/015/001/032/print-version_e.htm. 
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Montreal to four communities in western Nunavut.56  The crew 
reported seeing no ice in the Northwest Passage.57  Desgagnés 
Transarctik Inc. the company that owns the ship, and Nunavut 
Eastern Arctic Shipping, its main competitor, have similar voyages 
planned for 2009.58 
 Increased shipping can also be expected to result from easier 
access to Arctic hydrocarbons.  All of the Arctic Ocean countries—
Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States—have 
mapped or are mapping the seabed off their coastlines in support of 
claims to extended continental shelves under Article 76 of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.59  The U.S. Coastguard research 
icebreaker USCGC Healy spent the summers of 2007 and 2008 
mapping the Chukchi Cap, north of Alaska, in anticipation of the U.S. 
Senate giving its “advice and consent” to ratification of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).60 
 The mapping has taken on heightened urgency as the result of a 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) International Polar Year project, 
conducted with the participation of British Petroleum and Statoil, a 
Norwegian company, to assess the oil and gas resource potential of 
the Arctic.61  In its CircumArctic Resource Appraisal (CARA), 
published in May of 2009, USGS researchers concluded that the 
Arctic contained about 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of 
the world’s undiscovered gas, mostly offshore, under less than 500 
                                                                                                                      
 56. 1st Commercial Ship Sails Through the Northwest Passage, CAN. 
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Nov. 28, 2008, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/ 
2008/11/28/nwest-vessel.html. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Bob Weber, Thinning Ice Already Increasing Traffic in Northwest Passage, 
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), June 14, 2009, available at 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/science/thinning-ice-already-
increasing-traffic-in-northwest-passage/article1181733/. 
 59. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397, art. 76, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
convention_overview_convention.htm [hereinafter UNCLOS] (provides the definition of 
a continental shelf); see also Constance Johnson & Alex Oude Elferink, Submissions to 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Cases of Unresolved Land and 
Maritime Disputes: The Significance of Article 76(10) of the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 161–79 (David Freestone, 
R. Barnes & D.M. Ong eds.,  2006) (summarizing recommendations of the Commission 
on the limits of the continental shelf in regard to the submission made by the Russian 
Federation on 20 December 2001 and the submission made by Norway on 27 November 
2006).  
 60. Robert Lee Hotz, U.S. Draws Map Of Rich Arctic Floor Ahead of Big Melt, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2007, at B1. 
 61. See International Polar Year, U.S. Geological Survey, Expressions of Intent 
for IPY 2007-2008 Activities, I.D. No. 913, http://classic.ipy.org/development/ 
eoi/details.php?id=913 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (explaining that international 
partners for the activities of the U.S. Geological Survey in the International Polar Year 
included British Petroleum and Statoil).   
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meters of water.62  All the major oil companies will be looking at the 
Northwest Passage as a potentially important shipping route in 
support of their activities in the Arctic—just as Humble Oil (now 
Exxon) did with the Manhattan in 1969.63  Royal Dutch Shell has 
already commissioned an analysis of the legal status of the 
waterway.64  
 Finally, there are the “adventurers”: men and women seeking to 
relive the exploits of the early explorers by sailing small private 
vessels through the Northwest Passage.65  In August 2007, the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) arrested five Norwegians intent on 
challenging Canada’s authority over the waterway.66  The self-
designated “Vikings” sailed their yacht, the Berserk II, three-quarters 
of the way through the waterway without seeking permission.67  
Fortunately, authorities had deported two members of the crew from 
Canada on a previous occasion for reasons unrelated to Arctic 
sovereignty (membership in the Norwegian branch of the Hells 
Angels motorcycle gang).68  These two individuals made the mistake 
of disembarking from the yacht and setting foot on indisputably 
sovereign Canadian soil just outside Cambridge Bay, Nunavut.69  At 
this point, the RCMP pounced, assisted by a Canadian Coast Guard 
light icebreaker, the CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier.70  But what if the 
Norwegians had not set foot on Canadian soil?  What if, instead of a 
small yacht, the vessel was a single-hulled oil tanker flying a flag of 
                                                                                                                      
 62. Donald L. Gautier et al., Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the 
Arctic, 324 SCIENCE 1175, 1175 (2009). 
 63. DONAT PHARAND, NORTHWEST PASSAGE: ARCTIC STRAITS 47 (1984). 
[O]il companies began to consider the possibility of using the Northwest 
Passage to transport oil to the American eastern seabord. Consequently, in 
1969 Humble Oil (now Exxon USA) had the S/T Manhattan, a huge 155,000-ton 
tanker, converted into an icebreaking vessel and sent through the Northwest 
Passage to determine the feasibility of year-round navigation. 
Id. 
 64. This information was obtained through confidential interviews conducted 
by the authors. 
 65.  See Sara Minogue, Rites of Passage Thwart Northern Adventurers, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 8, 2007, at A14, available at 
http://www.saraminogue.com/stories/rites.html (providing accounts of sailors that are 
failing to register).   
 66. For a partial report of the incident, see Bill Curry, Viking Invaders Turned 
Back from Our Shores, The GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 1, 2007, at A3. 
Coincidentally, one of the authors of this article (Byers) was in Cambridge Bay the day 
after the arrests and able to interview local officials “off-the-record.”  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Byers & Layton, How to Strengthen Our Arctic Security, THE TYEE, 
Sept. 6, 2007, available at http://thetyee.ca/Views/2007/09/06/ColdReality/ (discussing 
how the CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier helped RCMP with the arrest of five Norweigans). 
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convenience or a container ship with possible links to North Korea, 
Iran, or Al-Qaeda?  The next Parts of this Article examine the 
difficult question of national jurisdiction within the Northwest 
Passage to deal with environmental or security threats. 
III.  THE LEGAL DISPUTE: 1880-1985 
 Ownership is not an issue with regard to the islands of the Arctic 
archipelago,71 which Britain assigned to Canada in 1880.72  The 
resulting title has not been contested since Denmark abandoned its 
claim to Ellesmere Island in 1920 and Norway abandoned its claim to 
the Sverdrup Islands in 1928–1930.73  The only exception has been an 
inconsequential dispute with Denmark over Hans Island, a tiny, 
barren islet between Ellesmere Island and northern Greenland in the 
middle of Kennedy Channel, more than 500 miles to the north of 
Lancaster Sound (the principal eastern entrance to the Northwest 
Passage).74 
A. The Sector Theory 
 As for the Northwest Passage itself, the nearly impenetrable ice 
meant that the issue of ownership and control of the waterway was, 
for decades, never even discussed.75  At most, a claim to the Arctic 
waters was implicit in an assertion made in 1907 by Canadian 
Senator Pascal Poirier that Canada owned everything within a pie-
shaped sector extending from the continental coastline to the 
geographic North Pole.76  The same perception of Canada’s Arctic 
                                                                                                                      
 71. N.C. Howson, Breaking the Ice: The Canadian-American Dispute over the 
Arctic’s Northwest Passage, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 346 (1988). According to 
Howson, “[n]o nation, including the United States, challenges Canada’s territorial 
sovereignty over the ice-covered islands of the Arctic archipelago.” Id.  
 72. For a historical account of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, see Ivan L. Head, 
Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic Regions, 9 MCGILL L.J. 200 
(1963). By an Order-in-Council dated 31 July 1880, “ . . . all the British possessions on 
the American continent, not hitherto annexed to any colony . . .” were transferred to 
Canada. Id. at 212.  
 73. R.R. Roth, Sovereignty and Jurisdiction Over Arctic Waters 28 ALTA L.REV. 
845, 851 (1990).  
 74. Kenn Harper, Hans Island Resources, http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/ 
hansIsland/default.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). 
 75. Head, supra note 72 at 218. In 1963, Ivan Head, then at the Canadian 
Department of External Affairs, wrote: “It is highly unlikely that uninterrupted surface 
passage from the Labrador Sea to either the Arctic Ocean or the Beaufort Sea, or vice 
versa, will ever be a reality.” Id.  
 76. Robert S. Reid, The Canadian Claim to Sovereignty Over the Waters of the 
Arctic, [1974] 12 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 111, 115. Reid reports that the first official 
manifestation of the sector theory was a 1904 Canadian Department of the Interior 
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sovereignty was shared by Canadian explorer Captain J.E. Bernier,77 
who, on July 1, 1909, affixed a plaque on Melville Island that reads: 
This Memorial is erected today to commemorate the taking possession 
for the DOMINION OF CANADA of the whole ARCTIC 
ARCHIPELAGO lying to the north of America from longitude 60°W. to 
141°W. up to latitude 90°N.78 
In 1946, Lester B. Pearson, then Canada’s ambassador to the United 
States, made the claim over water explicit by declaring that the 
sector theory justified Canada’s claims “not only to the land within 
the sector, but to the frozen sea as well.”79  However, subsequent 
government pronouncements cast doubt on Canada’s reliance on the 
sector theory as a basis for its claims.80  
 Nor has the applicability of the sector theory to Arctic waters 
ever been accepted internationally.  When Norway recognized 
Canada’s sovereignty over the Sverdrup Islands in 1930, it specified 
that the move was “in no way based on any sanction whatever of 
what is named ‘the sector principle.’”81  When the Soviet Union used 
the sector theory to define its Arctic territory in 1926, it chose not to 
apply the theory to the ice or waters beyond the then three-mile limit 
of the territorial sea.82  The same is true in the Antarctic, where a 
number of countries have claimed sectors of the continent but not the 
outlying waters or seabed.83 
 Faced with international opposition to its sector-based claim, the 
Canadian government for decades chose to neither advance nor 
                                                                                                                      
map showing “the western boundary of Canada as being the 141st meridian of west 
longitude extending to the Pole, and the eastern boundary as being the 60th meridian 
of west longitude extending from just east of Ellesmere Island northerly to the Pole.” 
Id. 
 77. Donald R. Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A 
Reassessment, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 331, 336 (1993). 
 78. I HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 1730 (Jul. 10, 1909) (Can.) (inscription by 
J.E. Bernier), reprinted in Head, supra note 72, at 211. 
 79. Lester B. Pearson, Canada Looks Down North, 24 FOREIGN AFF. 638, 639 
(1946); see also Reid, supra note 76, at 115. 
 80. For example, see III HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 6958 (August 3, 1956) 
(Can.) (statement of Hon. Jean Lesage). Lesage was the minister of the newly created 
Department of Northern Affairs.  
 81. Note from Daniel Steen, The Norwegian Chargé d’Affaires, London, to 
Arthur Henderson, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London (Aug. 8, 1930), 
available at http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/1930.html. 
 82. Reid, supra note 76, at 116. Donat Pharand writes: “[T]he general opinion 
of publicists and informed commentators is that the sector theory has no legal validity 
as a source of title in international law, and cannot serve as a legal basis for the 
acquisition of sovereignty over land, and, a fortiori, over sea areas.” Donat Pharand, 
Canada’s Arctic Jurisdiction in International Law, 7 DALHOUSIE L.J. 315, 324 (1983). 
 83. Stuart B. Kaye, Territorial Sea Baselines Along Ice Covered Coasts: 
International Practice and Limits of the Law of the Sea, 35 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 75, 
79 (2004).  
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explicitly abandon the argument.  In August 2006, however, Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper surrendered the sector theory in a speech in 
Iqaluit, Nunavut:  
I am here today to make it absolutely clear there is no question about 
Canada’s Arctic border.  It extends from the northern tip of Labrador 
all the way up the East coast of Ellesmere Island to Alert.  Then it 
traces the western perimeter of the Queen Elizabeth Islands down to 
the Beaufort Sea.  From there it hugs the coasts of the Northwest 
Territories and Yukon to the Canada-U.S. border at Alaska.  All along 
the border, our jurisdiction extends outward 200 miles into the 
surrounding sea, just as it does along our Atlantic and Pacific 
coastlines.  No more.  And no less.84 
As defined by Harper, the limits of Canada’s jurisdiction along the 
northwest flank of the Arctic Archipelago fall hundreds of miles short 
of the 141st meridian. 
B. The SS Manhattan 
 In 1969, an American company, Humble Oil, sent an ice-
strengthened super-tanker—the SS Manhattan—through the 
Northwest Passage.85  The voyage was designed to test whether the 
route could be used to transport Alaskan oil to the Atlantic 
seaboard.86  The U.S. government dispatched the Coastguard 
icebreaker Northwind to accompany the vessel and made a point of 
not seeking permission from Canada.87  The Canadian government 
responded by granting permission anyway.88  It sent one of its own 
                                                                                                                      
 84. Stephen Harper, Can. Prime Minister, Speech on Securing Canadian 
Sovereignty in the Arctic (Aug. 12, 2006), available at http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/ 
2009/03/securing-canadian-sovereignty-in-the-arctic.html. 
 85. T.C. Pullen & H. Ian MacDonald, S.S.Manhattan’s Northwest Passage 
Voyage—Observations by Canada’s Representative (Feb. 12, 1970), transcribed in THE 
EMPIRE CLUB OF CANADA ADDRESSES 260 (1970), available at 
http://speeches.empireclub.org/details.asp?r=vs&ID= 61281&number=1.  
 86. Id. The ship sailed on August 24, 1969, and completed navigation of the 
Passage on September 14, 1969. Reid, supra note 76, at 111 n.1. The Manhattan was 
specially modified into an ice-breaking vessel of 115,000 tons and 43,000 horsepower. 
Id. Built in 1962, it was at the time the largest merchant ship ever to fly the American 
flag and the largest commercial ship ever constructed in the United States. Id. “The 
Manhattan . . . was as long as the Empire State building laid on its side and displaced 
about twice the amount of water as the Queen Elizabeth.” Larry Gedney & Merritt 
Helfferich, Voyage of the Manhattan, Dec. 19, 1983, Alaska Science Forum Article No. 
639, http://www.gi.alaska.edu/ScienceForum/ASF6/689.html. For an account of the 
Manhattan’s voyage, see Bern Keating, North for Oil: Manhattan Makes the Historic 
Northwest Passage, 137 NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 374 (1970). 
 87. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO 
EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 339 (1996). 
 88. See Pullen & MacDonald, supra note 85 (Canadian government 
representative remarks imply that permission was given).  
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icebreakers to help89 and arranged for a Canadian government 
representative, Captain Thomas Charles Pullen, to be on board the 
Manhattan during the transit.90 
 Although Washington’s refusal to ask for prior authorization 
unleashed a political storm in Ottawa, the firm belief that the 
Manhattan would not sail through areas under Canadian jurisdiction 
was the basis for the refusal.91  At the time, Canada claimed only a 3-
mile territorial sea, which left a high seas corridor through the 
Northwest Passage.92  American officials had therefore intended that 
the Manhattan would remain on the high seas throughout its voyage, 
entering the Passage through Lancaster Sound and exiting through 
M’Clure Strait at the western end.93  Indeed, prior to the Manhattan’s 
voyage, the State Department had informed the Canadian 
government that it had no intention of staking a claim to the 
Northwest Passage and was merely undertaking a feasibility study.94  
However, on the night of September 10, 1969, while attempting to 
become the first vessel ever to make an east-to-west passage of 
M’Clure Strait, the Manhattan became trapped in the ice.95  “She 
escaped only when steam was diverted from heating the living spaces 
to squeeze an additional 7,000 horsepower from her 43,000 
horsepower turbines.  Even then, it was only with the assistance of 
her constant companion, the Canadian icebreaker, ‘John A. 
McDonald,’ that she was able to escape.”96  These circumstances 
forced the Manhattan to turn back and use the narrow Prince of 
Wales Strait, where, as Pharand explains, “it had to go through the 
territorial waters of Canada because of the presence of the small 
                                                                                                                      
 89. Id. The accompanying Canadian Coast Guard vessel was the J.A. 
Macdonald, a heavy icebreaker built in 1960 with a cruising range of 20,000 nautical 
miles and a displacement of 9,000 tons. Id. According to the New York Times: “The 
‘Johnny Mac’, as the vessel is called by the crew of the Manhattan, started out on the 
expedition as just another member of the supporting cast, but she earned co-star status 
by her performance on the voyage. The sturdy veteran of 10 seasons in the Arctic freed 
the Manhattan from ice on at least 12 occasions.” W.D. Smith, Tanker Manhattan is 
Escorted Into Halifax Harbor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1969. 
 90. Pullen & MacDonald, supra note 86. Captain Pullen played a critical role 
throughout the voyage, “advising Humble Oil on matters of ice navigation, ice 
seamanship, route selection and tactics appropriate to ships working as a group in 
heavy pack ice.” Id. 
 91. See John Kirton & Don Munton, The Manhattan Voyages and Their 
Aftermath, in POLITICS OF THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE 73, 73–97 (Franklyn Griffiths ed., 
1987) (chronicling Ottawa’s response to the Manhattan voyage). 
 92. Reid, supra note 76, at 120. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Jay Walz, Oil Stirs Concern Over Northwest Passage Jurisdiction, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1969, at 12. 
 95. Gedney & Helfferich, supra note 86. 
 96. Id.  
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Princess Royal Islands.”97  The unanticipated character of the 
entrance into Canadian territorial waters, combined with Canada’s 
unsolicited permission, the acceptance of considerable assistance from 
the Canadian Coast Guard, and the welcoming of Captain Pullen on 
board prevented—as Ottawa later argued—any undermining of 
Canada’s claim.98 
C. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
 The following year, the Canadian Parliament adopted the Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA).99  The legislation imposed 
strict safety and environmental requirements on all shipping within 
100 nautical miles of Canada’s Arctic coast, including the islands.100  
The AWPPA was, at the time, contrary to international law, which 
did not recognize coastal state rights in the waters beyond the 
territorial sea.101  Indeed, the Canadian government effectively 
admitted that the AWPPA was illegal when, shortly before adopting 
the statute, it entered a reservation to its acceptance of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
that prevented any future litigation over the matter.102  The United 
                                                                                                                      
 97. Donat Pharand, The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final 
Revisit, 38 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 3, 38 (2007). 
 98. Kirton & Munton, supra note 91 (discussing the diplomatic response to 
these voyages). 
 99. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. ch. 2 (1970), amended by 
S.C. ch. 41 (1977–78) (Can.). 
 100. R.S.C. ch.2. With the AWPPA, Canada was asserting a right to enforce 
pollution prevention regulations on all ships passing through the 100 mile zone, 
including construction, equipment and staffing standards for Arctic-going vessels. Id. 
Failure to comply with these standards would result in the prohibition of passage. Id. 
Under the Act, this broad assertion of jurisdiction was justified with reference to 
Canada’s responsibility for the exploitation of the Arctic’s resources as well as for the 
welfare of its inhabitants and the preservation of its unique ecological balance. Id. 
 101.  Coastal rights beyond the territorial sea were recognized, however, as 
regards the continental shelf. 
 102. Texts Governing the Jurisdiction of the Court, 24 INT’L CT. JUST. Y.B. 45, 
55–56 (1969–70). The reservation excluded from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
over Canada any  
disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised 
by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or exploitation of the 
living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution 
or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the 
coast of Canada. 
Id. In explaining the need for the reservation, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
acknowledged that there was a “very grave risk that the World Court would find itself 
obliged to find that coastal states cannot take steps to prevent pollution. Such a 
legalistic decision would set back immeasurably the development of law in this critical 
area.” Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister Can., Press Speech (Apr. 8, 1970), quoted in 
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States responded to the legislation by sending a diplomatic note 
entitled “U.S. Opposes Unilateral Extension by Canada of High Seas 
Jurisdiction.”103  The note explained the reason for the United States’ 
position as follows: 
We are concerned that this action by Canada if not opposed by us, 
would be taken as precedent in other parts of the world for other 
unilateral infringements of the freedom of the seas.  If Canada had the 
right to claim and exercise exclusive pollution and resources 
jurisdiction on the high seas, other countries could assert the right to 
exercise jurisdiction for other purposes, some reasonable and some not, 
but equally invalid according to international law.104 
The United States suggested that Canada voluntarily submit the 
issue to the ICJ,105 but Canada refused to do so.106 
 The dispute over the AWPPA receded after the 1982 adoption of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 234 of 
which allows coastal states to enact laws against maritime pollution 
out to 200 nautical miles when almost year-round ice creates 
exceptional navigational hazards.107  The adoption of this provision 
also contributed to the development of a parallel rule of customary 
international law, as Canada effectively recognized when it rescinded 
the reservation to its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
ICJ in 1985—nine years before UNCLOS came into force and a full 
eighteen years before Canada ratified the treaty.108  In the following 
two decades, no one challenged Canada before the ICJ about the 
AWPPA or any of its other Arctic-related claims.  On June 11, 2009, 
Canada took full advantage of Article 234 by extending the reach of 
the AWPPA to 200 nautical miles.109 
                                                                                                                      
Richard Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on 
the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1970–1971). 
 103. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Press Release No. 121 (Apr. 15, 1970), 
quoted in J.A. Beesley & C.B. Bourne, Canadian Practice in International Law During 
1970 as Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department 
of External Affairs, [1971] 9 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 276, 287–88 . 
 104. Id. In 1978, a Canadian official acknowledged that a “drawer full of 
protests” had been received concerning the AWPPA. Comments of Erik Wang, Dir. of 
Legal Operations, Dep’t of External Affairs, Can., House of Commons, Standing Comm. 
on External Affairs and Nat’l Def., Proceedings, No. 16 (Apr. 27, 1978), quoted in Ted 
McDorman, The New Definition of ‘Canada Lands’ and the Determination of the Outer 
Limit of the Continental Shelf, 14 J. MAR. L. & COM. 195, 215 (1983). 
 105. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 102, at 289. 
 106. Beesley & Bourne, supra note 103, at 289–94.  
 107. UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 234. 
 108. See Texts Governing the Jurisdiction of the Court, supra note 103, at 64 
(terminating Canada’s acceptance “of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice”). 
 109. Randy Boswell, New Measures Beef Up Control of Arctic: Expert Canadian 
Authority Over Shipping Extended, OTTAWA CITIZEN, June 19, 2009, available at 
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 A second piece of legislation, also adopted in 1970, extended 
Canada’s territorial sea from three to twelve nautical miles.110  
Although the United States also officially protested against this 
measure,111 the extension of Canada’s territorial sea to twelve miles 
was far less controversial than the AWPPA since sixty other countries 
had already made similar claims.112  Its immediate relevance lay in 
the fact that the Northwest Passage is less than twenty-four miles 
across at its narrowest points.113  It thus became impossible to travel 
through the Passage, as the captain of the Manhattan had planned, 
without passing through Canada’s territorial sea at certain 
geographical choke-points.114 “According to the Canadian 
government, the newly overlapping territorial seas entitled it to 
subject any transiting vessel to the full range of Canada’s domestic 
laws.”115 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.canada.com/Technology/measures+beef+control+Arctic+expert/1710976/ 
story.html. 
110. Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, 1969-1970 S.C., 
ch. 68, sec. 1243 (Can.). 
 111. The April 15, 1970 diplomatic note entitled “U.S. Opposes Unilateral 
Extension by Canada of High Seas Jurisdiction” “attacked both extensions: the first, 
from three to twelve miles for the territorial sea, and the second, over all shipping in 
the Arctic waters for one hundred miles.” Howson, supra note 71, at 352 n.72 (citation 
omitted). Howson’s interpretation seems to be borne out by the use of the plural in the 
first sentence of the diplomatic note: “International law provides no basis for these 
proposed unilateral extensions of jurisdiction on the high seas . . . .” Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, supra note 103, at 288 (emphasis added). 
 112. Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister Can., Remarks to the Press Following the 
Introduction of Legislation on Arctic Pollution, Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones in the 
Canadian House of Commons (April 8, 1970), in 9 I.L.M. 600 (1970). The right to a 
twelve-mile territorial sea was eventually codified in Article 3 of UNCLOS. UNCLOS, 
supra, note 59, art. 3. 
 113. Kirton & Munton, supra note 91, at 73. 
 114. Howson writes:  
The 1970 Bill extending Canada’s territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles . . . was 
designed in part to create an overlap of territorial waters in the Western 
portion of Barrow Strait, where the widest gap of sea between islands dotted 
across the strait (Lowther and Young Islands) is only 15.5 miles. This ‘gate’ of 
territorial waters already existed under the 3 mile rule in the Prince of Wales 
Strait, where the Princess Royal Islands, similarly dotted across the much 
narrower strait, reduce the widest gap to less than 6 miles. 
Howson, supra note 71, at 355–56 n.86. Since Bellot Strait is less than one mile across, 
the addition of a gate in the Barrow Strait had the effect of forcing any vessel making 
the passage, including through M’Clure Strait, to enter Canada’s territorial sea. 
 115. Id. at 10. In 1970, the legal advisor for the Canadian Department of 
External Affairs declared in testimony before the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on External Affairs and National Defence:  
[The enactment of a 12-mile limit] has implications for Barrow Strait, for 
example, where the 12-mile territorial sea has the effect of giving Canada 
sovereignty from shore to shore. To put it simply, we have undisputed control—
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D. Historic International Waters 
 At the same time, Canada began arguing that the straits and 
channels between the islands were historic internal waters.  Under 
international law, a country may validly claim title over waters on 
historic grounds if it can show that it has, for a considerable length of 
time, effectively exercised its exclusive authority over the maritime 
area in question.116  In addition, it must show that, during the same 
                                                                                                                      
undisputed in the legal sense—over two of the gateways to the Northwest 
Passage. 
Standing Comm. on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence, No. 25, at 18 (statement of the legal adviser of the Department of External 
Affairs), quoted in PHARAND, supra note 20, at 124. 
 116. The first official statement indicating that Canada might be claiming the 
waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago as historic internal waters, according to 
Pharand, was made by Prime Minister Trudeau at the time of the Manhattan crossing 
in October 1969. PHARAND, supra note 20, at 111. The statement, included in a Speech 
from the Throne, read in part:  
Canadian activities in the northern reaches of this continent have been far-
flung but pronounced for many years, to the exclusion of the activities of any 
other government. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police patrols and 
administers justice in these regions on land and ice, in the air and in the 
waters. 
I HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 39 (Oct. 24, 1969) (Can.), quoted in PHARAND, supra 
note 20, at 111(emphasis added in PHARAND).  Pharand states:  
Having specified that the Canadian Eskimos pursue ‘their activities over the 
icy waters without heed as to whether that ice is supported by land or by water’, 
the statement emphasizes the long duration of those activities and concludes by 
saying that ‘Arctic North America has, for 450 years, progressively become the 
Canadian Arctic.’ 
PHARAND, supra note 20, at 111. Pharand also refers to a December 1969 report 
prepared for the House of Commons by the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development in which it was stated: “Your Committee considers that the 
waters lying between the islands of the Arctic Archipelago have been, and are, subject 
to Canadian sovereignty historically, geographically and geologically.” Id. In December 
1973, an official of the Canadian Department of External Affairs replied to a letter 
enquiring as to the legal status of the Arctic waters, declaring that “Canada . . . claims 
that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are internal waters of Canada, on a 
historical basis, although they have not been declared as such in any treaty or by any 
legislation.” Edward G. Lee, Canadian Practice in International Law During 1973 as 
Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of 
External Affairs, 12 CAN Y.B. INT’L L. 272, 279 (1974) (emphasis added). Pharand 
comments that “[t]his unquestionably constitutes the clearest and most precise 
statement as to the nature of and basis for Canada’s claim over Arctic waters.” 
PHARAND, supra note 20, at 112. For an example of a country claiming title over waters 
on historical grounds, see, e.g., Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 130–31 
(Dec. 18) (holding Norway may claim waters as historic based on their exclusive 
authority of control and acquiescence of foreign states over the control). See generally 
CLIVE R. SYMMONS, HISTORIC WATERS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: A MODERN RE-
APPRAISAL (2008) (examining the role of historic waters in international law); Donat 
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period of time, other countries, especially those directly affected by 
the exercise of authority, have acquiesced in it.117 
 Hudson Bay is a good example.  Canada has claimed its 450,000 
square mile expanse of water as a “historic bay” since 1906.118  The 
United States initially filed a protest, but for more than a century, no 
country has publicly opposed the claim.119  It would not be in the U.S. 
national interest to lodge public opposition, since shipping traffic 
through Hudson Bay does not lead anywhere except the port of 
Churchill, Manitoba.  Moreover, James Bay—at the southern end of 
Hudson Bay—extends to within 1,000 miles of Chicago, Detroit, and 
New York City, putting those cities within easy reach of ship-
launched cruise missiles.  However, thanks to Hudson Bay’s status as 
historic internal waters, Canada, in concert with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD), can legitimately deny access to 
warships of non-allies.120 
 Canada’s claim that the Northwest Passage constitutes historic 
internal waters is based on the fact that British explorers mapped the 
archipelago prior to the transfer of title in 1880,121 and Canadians 
patrolled and policed it after that date.122  Canadian involvement in 
                                                                                                                      
Pharand, Historic Waters in International Law with Special Reference to the Arctic, 21 
U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1971) (same). 
 117.  See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 116  at 130–31 (Norway was able to 
claim waters partially due to acquiescence of foreign states over control); see generally 
Historic Waters, supra note 116 (explaining concept of historic waters); SYMMONS, 
supra note 116 (same). 
 118. OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112: UNITED STATES 
RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE NATIONAL MARITIME CLAIMS 10 (1992), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58381.pdf.  
 119. An Act to Amend the Fisheries Act, 1906 S.C., ch. 13 (Can.); OFFICE OF 
OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 10. 
 120. JOHN O’BRIEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 440 (2001); see also R.R. CHURCHILL & 
A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 36–38 (3d ed. 1999) (provides a description of historic 
bays). 
 121. According to Pharand, “British explorers, beginning with Martin Frobisher 
in 1576 and ending with those in search of the Franklin expedition in 1859, covered 
virtually all the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.” PHARAND, supra note 20, 
at 113. 
 122. Pharand provides a useful summary of Canadian activity in his book 
CANADA’S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at Chapter 8 (“Historic waters 
applied to the Canadian Arctic Archipelago”). PHARAND, supra note 20, at 122. In 1906, 
Canada adopted legislation requiring whalers to obtain licences for Hudson Bay and 
the waters north of the 50th parallel. Id. “In 1922, the Eastern Arctic Patrol was 
created and annual patrols were made until at least 1958.” Id. These patrols, for the 
most part carried out by the RCMP, occasionally extended to the waters of the western 
Arctic. Id. In 1926, the Arctic Islands Preserve was created within the sector formed by 
the 60th and 141st degrees of longitude with the aim of protecting Arctic wildlife and 
Inuit culture. Id. After World War II, the Canadian Coast Guard was established and 
charged with the principal tasks of providing icebreaking services and re-supplying 
Arctic communities. Id. Since 1970, Canadian survey ships have been active in 
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Northwest Passage transits can also be cited as evidence of Canada’s 
authority over the waterway.123 
 However, even if Canada has effectively exercised its exclusive 
authority over the maritime area claimed, it still has to satisfy the 
acquiescence criterion.124  Pharand considers this to be a fatal flaw in 
Canada’s historic waters argument, for none of the early activity was 
coupled with an explicit claim to the straits and channels between the 
islands, while the United States opposed later explicit expressions of 
the claim.125  However, very few people considered the legal status of 
the waterway prior to the 1960s and, to the degree anyone did, they 
were working for the Canadian government in conducting sovereignty 
patrols on water and sea-ice, legislating on whaling, and protecting 
marine mammals and fish on behalf of an indigenous maritime 
people.126 
 Indeed, the strongest element in Canada’s historic waters claim 
is the use and occupation of the sea-ice by the Inuit, who have 
hunted, fished, travelled, and lived on the Northwest Passage for 
millennia.127  In Kugluktuk, we interviewed Alice Ayalik, a 72-year 
old artisan who spent most of the first thirteen years of her life on the 
frozen surface of Coronation Gulf, where her family lived in igloos, 
fished through the ice, and hunted seals.  All along the Northwest 
Passage, there are hundreds of Inuit elders who, in their youth, called 
the frozen waterway home. 
 Prior to the negotiations on the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims 
Agreement, Inuit from across the Arctic were interviewed about 
traditional hunting and travelling patterns.  The resulting map 
confirmed that the waters south of Ellesmere Island and the 
Sverdrup Islands—including Lancaster Sound and Barrow Strait—
were virtual highways for the Inuit and their dog teams.128  More 
recently, the Inuit Heritage Trust has been interviewing elders about 
Inuktitut place names along the Northwest Passage.129  The literally 
                                                                                                                      
surveying and charting the waters of the Archipelago and, in 1977, Canada instituted 
the NORDREG registration system for ships entering the Arctic. Id. at 122. 
 123. See discussion of the Manhattan and Polar Sea voyages at supra Part III.B 
and infra Part III.E, respectively. 
 124. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays—Study 
Prepared by the Secretariat, [1962] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 19 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143, 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_143.pdf. 
 125. PHARAND, supra note 20, at 121–25. 
 126. Id. at 121 
 127. See David Vanderzwaag & Donat Pharand, Inuit and the Ice: Implications 
for Canadian Arctic Waters, [1983] 21 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 53, 79–83 (discussing Inuit 
dominion over the ice and their ability to cede it to Canada). 
 128. The map is reproduced in PHARAND, supra note 20, at 165.  
 129. Inuit Heritage Trust: Place Names Program, http://www.ihti.ca/place-
names/pn-index.html?agree=0 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). 
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thousands of names confirm the centrality of the frozen waterway to 
the Inuit’s language, culture, history, and identity.  
 It is possible that the Inuit acquired an historic title over the 
Arctic waters before the arrival of the Europeans, which they 
subsequently transferred to Canada.130  To succeed with this 
argument, Canada would have to persuade other countries—or a 
court or tribunal—that (1) sea ice can be subject to occupancy and 
appropriation like land131; (2) under international law, indigenous 
people can acquire and transfer sovereign rights132; and (3) 
indigenous rights holders ceded such rights, if they did exist, to 
Canada.  The latter point is the easiest to prove, since the Nunavut 
Land Claims Agreement affirms the intent of the Inuit to transfer to 
Canada any rights they might have had over the sea-ice under 
international law.133  That particular provision was included at the 
insistence of the Inuit negotiators, and its existence makes Pharand’s 
earlier dismissal of the historic waters argument less convincing than 
it was before. 
 Pharand’s views did, however, lead the Canadian government to 
advance a different legal argument after the status of the Northwest 
Passage was again brought into play in 1985. 
E. USCGC Polar Sea 
 In May 1985, the United States informed the Canadian 
government that the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker USCGC Polar Sea 
would sail through the Northwest Passage on her way home to 
Seattle from Thule, Greenland, that August; the U.S. government 
also invited Canadian Coast Guard personnel to participate in the 
exercise.134  The telegram reiterated the official U.S. position that 
                                                                                                                      
 130. J. Woehrling, Les revendications du Canada sur les eaux de l’archipel de 
l’Arctique et l’utilisation immémoriale des glaces par les Inuit [Canadian Claims to the 
Waters of the Arctic Archipelago and the Historical Use of the Glaciers by the Inuit], 
[1987] 30 GERM. Y.B. INT’L L. 120, 139. 
 131. See S.B. Boyd, The Legal Status of the Arctic Sea Ice: A Comparative Study 
and a Proposal, [1984] 22 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 98, 105 (describing how ice has some of the 
characteristics of land). 
 132. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, 79 (Oct. 16) 
(recognizing that territories inhabited by indigenous peoples having a measure of social 
and political organization were not terra nullius and thus conferred a limited but no 
less real international legal status on these human “collectivités”). 
 133. Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her 
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Can. Inuit, art 15.1.1(c), May 25, 1993, 
available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/pdf/nunav_e.pdf (“Canada’s sovereignty 
over the waters of the arctic archipelago is supported by Inuit use and occupancy.”). 
 134. Rob Huebert, Steel, Ice and Decision-Making: The Voyage of the Polar Sea 
and its Aftermath. The Making of Canadian Northern Foreign Policy 211–14, 230 
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis). 
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this transit “will be an excuse of navigational rights and freedoms not 
requiring prior notification.  The United States appreciates that 
Canada may not share this position.”135  An American diplomatic 
note followed on May 21, 1985, stating that “the two countries should 
agree to disagree on the legal issues and concentrate on practical 
matters” and that this valuable opportunity for cooperation should 
“not be lost because of possible disagreements over the relevant 
juridical regime.”136 
 Canada responded on June 11, 1985, with a diplomatic note 
reiterating its legal position that the waters of the Northwest Passage 
were Canadian internal waters but also informing Washington that it 
was “committed to facilitating navigation” through the Passage and 
“prepared to work toward this objective.”137  It was Canadian policy, 
as it remains today, to permit transits provided the vessels met 
rigorous equipment and ship design standards specified in the 
AWPPA.138  Another American note on June 24, 1985, made it clear 
that, “although the United States is pleased to invite Canadian 
participation in the transit, it has not sought the permission of the 
Government of Canada, nor has it given Canada notification of the 
fact of the transit.”139  However, the note also stated, importantly, 
that the “United States considers that this transit . . . in no way 
prejudices the juridical position of either side regarding the 
Northwest Passage, and it understands that the Government of 
Canada shares that view.”140 
 According to Rob Huebert, by the end of June 1985, the two 
governments felt they had worked out an acceptable arrangement 
regarding the political and legal implications of the Polar Sea’s 
upcoming transit of the Northwest Passage.141  Yet on July 31, 1985, 
the eve of the voyage, the Canadian government sent a final 
communication to the United States in which it 
noted with deep regret that the United States remains unwilling, as it 
has been for many years, to accept that the waters of the Arctic 
archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of 
Canada and fall within Canadian sovereignty. 
                                                                                                                      
 135. U.S. Dep’t of State, Telegram No. 151842 (May 17, 1985), reprinted in 
OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 73. 
 136. American Embassy Ottawa, Démarche from the United States to Canada 
(May 21, 1985), reprinted in ROACH & SMITH, supra, note 87, at 343. 
 137. Canadian Embassy, Note No. 331 (June 11, 1985), reprinted in ROACH & 
SMITH, supra, note 87, at 344. 
 138. See discussion infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 139. United States, Diplomatic Note No. 222 (June 24, 1985), reprinted in 
OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 73–74. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Huebert, supra note 134, at 239. 
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 . . .  In this regard, the Government of Canada indeed shares the view 
of the United States, communicated in the State Department’s Note No. 
222 of June 24, 1985 that “the transit, and the preparations for it, in no 
way prejudice their juridical position of either side regarding the 
Northwest Passage.” 
This information and these assurances have satisfied the Government 
of Canada that appropriate measures have been taken by and under 
the authority of the Government of the United States to ensure that the 
Polar Sea substantially complies with the required standards for 
navigation in the waters of the Arctic archipelago and that in all other 
respects reasonable precautions have been taken to reduce the danger 
of pollution arising from this voyage.  Accordingly, the Embassy is now 
is a position to notify the United States that, in the exercise of 
Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, the Government of 
Canada is pleased to consent of the requested transit . . . .142 
In early August 1985, the Polar Sea completed its east-to-west transit 
of the Northwest Passage through Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, 
Viscount Melville Sound, and Prince of Wales Strait.  Two Canadian 
Coast Guard captains were on board as “invited observers.”143  
 Despite the diplomatic understanding between the two countries, 
the voyage “caused a rush of public anxiety in Canada.”144  
Commentators of all stripes denounced the government’s response as 
weak and ineffective and suggested that it had squandered a valuable 
opportunity to strengthen Canada’s legal position.145  The uproar 
caught the U.S. government off-guard.  An unidentified “senior 
official” in Washington was reported as describing an attitude of 
                                                                                                                      
 142. Canada, Note from Canada to the United States (July 31, 1985), reprinted 
in OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 74. An exemption order under the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act was issued for the Polar Sea. U.S.C.G.C. Polar 
Sea Exemption Order, P.C. Order 1985-2409, SOR/85-722 (Aug. 1, 1985). It was 
reported that “[l]awyers went through appropriate laws with fine-tooth combs and the 
Canadians took meticulous care over detail, down to the state of every piece of 
environmental equipment on the vessel.” Northwest Passage Not for the Soviets, U.S. 
Envoy Feels, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 2, 1985, at A1 [hereinafter Northwest 
Passage]. As for Canada’s unsolicited grant of consent, Huebert reports that the U.S. 
was “taken aback”—for it was deemed inconsistent with the agreed upon non-
prejudicial legal position. Huebert, supra note 134, at 240–42. 
 143. Jessie C. Carman, Economic and Strategic Implications of Ice-Free Arctic 
Seas, in GLOBALIZATION AND MARITIME POWER n.50 (S.J. Tangredi ed., 2002), available 
at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_ 
02/10_ch09.htm. 
 144. Chapter 10—A Northern Dimension for Canada’s Foreign Policy, in 
CANADA, PARLIAMENT, SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS, INDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONALISM: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON CANADA’S 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1985), available at http://www.carc.org/pubs/v14no4/ 
6.htm. 
 145. See, e.g., Franklyn Griffiths, Time to Ante Up in the Arctic Game, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 22, 1985, at A7 (Canada should “seize opportunity to make good 
on Arctic waters claim”); Bill Schiller, Our Borderline Move on Arctic Sovereignty, 
TORONTO STAR, Sep. 12, 1985, at A13 (discussing Canada’s response).  
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“surprise and disappointment” at the State Department, for they had 
“tried to work it out so that nobody’s legal rights were undercut,” and 
it was “absolutely wrong” to characterize the trip as a confrontational 
challenge to Canadian sovereignty.146 
F. Arctic Cooperation Agreement 
 In the wake of the Polar Sea controversy, the United States 
evinced a willingness to engage in bilateral discussions over the 
status of the Arctic waters.  After more than two years of negotiations 
and thanks in large part to personal interventions by Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan,147 Canada and the 
United States signed a four-clause “Arctic Cooperation Agreement” on 
January 11, 1988.148  In the Agreement, the United States pledged 
“that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by 
Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the 
Government of Canada.”149  
 McDorman encourages careful scrutiny of the wording and intent 
of the 1988 Agreement.150  Canadian consent is seemingly linked to 
marine scientific research conducted by American icebreakers,151 and 
Article 4 spells out that “[n]othing in this Agreement . . . nor any 
                                                                                                                      
 146. Northwest Passage, supra note 142, at A1. 
 147.  Christopher Kirkey, Smoothing Troubled Waters: The 1988 Canada-United 
States Arctic Cooperation Agreement, 50 INT’L J. 401, 405–16 (1995); Brian Mulroney, A 
Call for a New Northern Vision, POLICY OPTIONS, June 2006, at 5–9, available at 
http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/jun06/mulroney.pdf. 
 148. Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, U.S.-Can., Jan. 11, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. 
11565, 1852 U.N.T.S. 59. 
 149. Id. at para. 3.  
 150. T.L. MCDORMAN, SALT WATER NEIGHBORS: INTERNATIONAL OCEAN LAW 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 249 (2009). 
 151. Paragraph 3 of the 1988 Agreement states:  
In recognition of the close and friendly relations between their two countries, 
the uniqueness of ice-covered maritime areas, the opportunity to increase their 
knowledge of the marine environment of the Arctic through research conducted 
during icebreaker voyages, and their shared interest in safe, effective 
icebreaker navigation off their Arctic coasts: — The Government of the United 
States and the Government of Canada undertake to facilitate navigation by 
their icebreakers in their respective Arctic waters and to develop cooperative 
procedures for this purpose; — The Government of Canada and the 
Government of the United States agree to take advantage of their icebreaker 
navigation to develop and share research information, in accordance with 
generally accepted principles of international law, in order to advance their 
understanding of the marine environment of the area; —The Government of 
the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters 
claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the 
Government of Canada. 
Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, supra, note 148, at para. 3. 
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practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the 
Government of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the 
Sea in this or other maritime areas . . . .”152  McDorman’s concerns 
have proven correct.153  On October 27, 2006, U.S. Ambassador David 
Wilkins wrote a letter to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs 
in which he stated: 
 For the record, the United States sees no basis in international law to 
support Canada’s drawing of straight baselines around its Arctic 
islands and its claim that all the waters among the Canadian Arctic 
islands, including the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of 
Canada. 
 The Northwest Passage is a strait used for international negotiation. 
Therein, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, in 
accordance with international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention.  The enjoyment of transit passage is not subject to 
prior notice to, or permission from, Canada as the State bordering the 
strait.  However, an activity that is not an exercise of the right of 
transit passage, such as marine scientific research, remains subject to 
the other applicable provisions of international law. 
 Canada, consistent with its right as a coastal State under 
international law, requires that marine scientific research may be 
conducted in its waters only with its consent.  Accordingly, as set out in 
the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation of January 11, 1988, the United 
States agrees to seek Canada’s consent when U.S. icebreakers intend to 
conduct marine scientific research as they transit the Northwest 
Passage.  
 . . . . 
 The Agreement expressly provides that neither it nor any practice 
thereunder affects the legal views of the two Parties.  Thus, the 
Agreement does not affect the U.S. view that our icebreakers, in the 
absence of marine scientific research, would not be required to seek 
Canadian consent before transiting the Northwest Passage.154 
 The fact that this interpretation is now an explicit part of the 
U.S. position does not, however, settle the matter as a question of 
international law.  A different interpretation is just as reasonable, as 
demonstrated by the fact that Robert Smith and Ashley Roach used 
the conjunction “and” in their official compilation of U.S. legal 
positions on maritime claims: “This agreement sets forth the terms 
for cooperation by the two governments in coordinating research in 
the Arctic marine environment during icebreaker voyages and in 
facilitating safe, effective icebreaker navigation off their Arctic 
coasts.”155  
                                                                                                                      
 152. Id. at para.. 4. 
 153. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 154. Letter from David Wilkins, Ambassador of the U.S., to Peter Boehm, 
Assistant Deputy Minister, N. Am., Dep’t of Foreign Affairs & Int’l Trade (Can.) (Oct. 
27, 2006), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/98836.pdf. 
 155. OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 74 (emphasis added). 
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 McDorman’s point concerning the non-prejudicial character of 
the Arctic Cooperation Agreement and any subsequent U.S. 
Coastguard icebreaker transits is more important and 
unquestionably correct.  The agreement successfully addressed the 
principal irritant to Canada–United States relations in the Northwest 
Passage by taking the issue of U.S. Coastguard icebreakers out of the 
legal dispute.  With the multi-year ice precluding voyages by other 
foreign vessels, the deal regarding icebreakers was essentially an 
“agreement to disagree” with respect to the Northwest Passage 
dispute as a whole.156  It created a new status quo that might have 
solved the entire problem indefinitely if not for the sudden, 
unanticipated effects of climate change two decades later. 
IV.  THE LEGAL DISPUTE: 1986 TO THE PRESENT 
 Following the voyage of the Polar Sea in 1985, Canada acted to 
consolidate its legal position by drawing “straight baselines” 
connecting the outer headlands of its Arctic archipelago.157  Straight 
baselines became a legally accepted means for determining the extent 
of coastal state control along fragmented coastlines as the result of a 
1951 decision by the International Court of Justice in a dispute 
between Britain and Norway over fishing rights.158  In making the 
announcement, Joe Clark, then-Minister for External Affairs, stated 
that “[t]hese baselines define the outer limit of Canada’s historic 
internal waters.”159  
 The Canadian Government received letters of protest from two 
countries in response to the proclamation of its Arctic baselines.  A 
February 26, 1986 letter from James W. Dyer, Acting Assistant 
                                                                                                                      
 156. Id. 
 157. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, R.S.C., c.T 7 (1970) (Can.).  
 158. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 128 (Dec. 18). The ICJ held 
that the use of straight baselines was permitted in only two geographically defined 
circumstances: “Where a coast is deeply indented and cut into, as is that of Eastern 
Finmark, or where it is bordered by an Archipelago, such as the skjaergaard.” Id. The 
second geographical criterion was modified slightly in Article 7(1) of UNCLOS:  
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a 
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of 
straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the 
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 7 (emphasis added). As Canada was not a party to 
UNCLOS in 1986, its baselines were drawn pursuant to the ICJ’s ruling in the 
Fisheries Case. See discussion, infra text accompanying notes 178–79. 
 159. Joe Clark, Sec’y of State for External Affairs, Statement on Sovereignty, 
Sep. 10, 1985, reprinted in POLITICS OF THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE 271 (Franklyn 
Griffiths ed., 1987) (emphasis added). 
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Secretary of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, to 
Senator Charles Mathias Jr., a Maryland Republican, summarized 
the U.S. position: 
On September 10, 1985, the Government of Canada claimed all the 
waters among its Arctic islands as internal waters, and drew straight 
baselines around its Arctic islands to establish its claim.  The United 
States position is that there is no basis in international law to support 
the Canadian claim.  The United States cannot accept the Canadian 
claim because to do so would constitute acceptance of full Canadian 
control of the Northwest Passage and would terminate U.S. navigation 
rights through the Passage under international law.160 
As Pharand observes, the letter does not specify whether the U.S. 
objection was to the historic basis for the claim to internal waters, 
straight baselines themselves, or both.161  Since the letter clearly 
asserts that there is no basis to support the Canadian claim, however, 
Pharand believes that the U.S. objection refers to the claim itself, 
“regardless of its precise legal basis.”162 
 The second protest came from the Member States of the 
European Community through the British High Commission in 
Ottawa. The diplomatic note stated: 
The validity of the baselines with regard to other states depends upon 
the relevant principles of international law applicable in this case, 
including the principle that the drawing of baselines must not depart to 
any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast.  The 
Member States acknowledge that elements other than purely 
geographical ones may be relevant for purposes of drawing baselines in 
particular circumstances but are not satisfied that the present 
baselines are justified in general.  Moreover, the Member States cannot 
recognize the validity of a historic title as justification for the baselines 
drawn in accordance with the order.163 
The European objection is clearly directed at both the Arctic baseline 
system in general and the historic title in particular.  However, if the 
Canadian straight baselines were drawn simply to identify the 
precise extent of Canada’s historic internal waters in the Arctic, 
McDorman believes an argument could be made that such baselines 
are not captured by the normal rules concerning their length and 
proximity to the coast.164  Alternatively, Canada could argue that the 
waters enclosed by the baselines are “non-historic internal waters,” to 
                                                                                                                      
 160. U.S. Dep’t of State, File No. P86 0019-8641, reprinted in OFFICE OF OCEAN 
AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 29. 
 161. Pharand, supra note 97, at 12.  
 162. Id. 
 163. British High Commission Note No. 90/86 of July, 1986, reprinted in OFFICE 
OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 29–30. 
 164. MCDORMAN, supra note 150, at 238. 
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borrow McDorman’s description.165  In this case, Canada’s baselines 
will have to satisfy the relevant international legal criteria governing 
the construction of such lines. 
 In 1986, when Canada drew its baselines, it was not a party to 
either the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone or the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.  
Consequently, the validity of Canada’s baselines must be judged 
according to the customary rules applied by the International Court 
of Justice in the 1951 Norwegian Fisheries Case.166  In that judgment, 
the Court, when determining the validity of Norway’s baseline 
system, defined a threshold requirement by limiting the use of 
baselines to two particular geographic situations: 
Where a coast is deeply indented and cut into, as is that of Eastern 
Finnmark, or where it is bordered by an archipelago such as the 
“skjaergaard” along the western sector of the coast here in question, the 
base-line becomes independent of the low-water mark and can only be 
determined by means of a geometrical construction.167 
The Court’s threshold geographic criteria were subsequently codified 
in Article 4 of the 1958 Convention and Article 7(1) of UNCLOS, with 
the later provision explaining that 
 [i]n localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if 
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the 
method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be 
employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured.168 
The key phrase with respect to Canada’s Arctic baseline system is “a 
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.”  The 
Convention does not define these terms. How then is a “fringe of 
islands” to be defined, and at what distance offshore must such a 
fringe of islands be in order to be within the “immediate vicinity” of a 
coastline? 
 Roach and Smith tackled this two-part question in their 1996 
study “United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims.”  
According to the authors, both employees of the U.S. State 
Department at the time, 
[t]he United States has taken the position that such a fringe of islands 
must meet all of the following requirements: 
● the most landward point of each island lies no more than 24 
miles from the mainland coastline; 
                                                                                                                      
 165. Id. 
 166. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).  
 167. Id. at 128–29. 
 168. UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 7, para. 1. 
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● each island to which a straight baseline is to be drawn is not 
more than 24 miles apart from the island from which the 
straight baseline is drawn; and 
● the islands, as a whole, mask at least 50% of the mainland 
coastline in any given locality.169 
 However, state practice does not reveal a general endorsement of 
the American three-part test.  As Johnston rightly points out, “the 
Convention does not provide precise guidelines as to when straight 
baseline may or may not be used, and to that extent concedes much to 
the discretion of the coastal State.”170  Indeed, the lack of a 
mathematical measure to limit the length of straight baselines under 
article 7(1) contrasts sharply with the precise limit of twenty-four 
nautical miles imposed as a closing line for bays under article 10(5) of 
UNCLOS.171 
 Johnston alludes to the fact that the treaty version of the 
geographic criteria defined by the ICJ extended the threshold 
requirements: 
[T]he ILC [International Law Commission] decided, after much 
controversy, that the straight baseline of delineation should be 
available generally to any state whose coastline was “deeply indented 
and cut into” or to any state with “a fringe of islands along the coast in 
its immediate vicinity”: that is, to many coastal states whose coastline 
was not nearly so complex as Norway’s.172 
 He concludes, however, that “state practice since the 1950s has, 
as widely predicted, ‘altogether failed to reflect either [the ILC’s] 
limited view of the occasions when the method is available, or the 
notion that the length of straight baselines is inherently restricted by 
the concept of the ‘general direction of the coast.’”173 
 Johnston’s conclusions accord with a detailed study that the UN 
Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea completed the 
following year.174  Given the importance and value of this source, we 
reproduce a significant portion of the analysis relevant to article 7(1) 
here: 
                                                                                                                      
 169. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 87, at 63–64. 
 170. DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF OCEAN BOUNDARY-
MAKING 113 (1988). 
 171. UNCLOS, supra note 59, arts. 7(1), 10(5). 
 172. JOHNSTON, supra note 170 (citing Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone, art. 4, para. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205). 
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LAW 211 (2d ed. 1970)). 
 174. OFFICE FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF THE 
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35. In determining whether the conditions apply which would permit 
the use of straight baselines it is necessary to focus on the spirit as well 
as the letter of the first paragraph of article 7 . . .  
39. The spirit of article 7, in respect of indented coasts and fringing 
islands, will be preserved if straight baselines are drawn when the 
normal baseline and closing lines of bays and rivers would produce a 
complex pattern of territorial seas and when those complexities can be 
eliminated by the use of a system of straight baselines . . .  
41. While the phrase ‘deeply indented and cut into’ travelled intact from 
the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case Judgment to the 1982 United 
Nations Convention via the 1958 Convention, the phrase ‘a fringe of 
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity’ appears to be a 
widening of the phrase used in the Judgement: ‘or where it (a coast) is 
bordered by an archipelago such as the ‘skjaergaard.’ 
42. There is no uniformly identifiable objective test which will identify 
for everyone islands which constitute a fringe in the immediate vicinity 
of the coast . . . 
44. There are generally two situations where a fringe of islands is likely 
to exist. The first, which is related closely to the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries case Judgment, deals with islands which appear to form a 
unity with the mainland. Such islands appear to be dovetailed into the 
coast and on small-scale maps appear to be a continuation of the 
mainland . . .  
45. The second situation occurs when islands which are some distance 
from the coast form a screen which masks a large proportion of the 
coast from the sea . . . However the coast may be screened by a swarm 
of small islands which by their number justify consideration as a fringe 
. . .  
46. The descriptive phrase ‘in its (the coast’s) immediate vicinity’ is a 
concept which has a clear meaning but for which there is no absolute 
test. While a fringe of islands three nautical miles from the coast may 
be considered as being in its immediate vicinity, a fringe 100 nautical 
miles distant would not. It is generally agreed that with a 12-mile 
territorial sea, a distance of 24 miles would satisfy the conditions. The 
distance that has been proposed in the literature as a general rule is 48 
miles, which could be exceeded in certain circumstances, but this figure 
is not necessarily widely agreed upon.175 
Pharand has argued that the Arctic Archipelago “presents two 
characteristics of fundamental importance” in regards to the 
geographic threshold: “the proximity of the Archipelago to the 
[Canadian] coast and the unity of the Archipelago itself.”176 
As for the proximity to the coast, there can be no question that this 
element is present, since not only are most of the islands, which form 
the base of the Archipelago located very close to the coast, but the coast 
itself, through its central peninsula, advances into the very core of the 
Archipelago. . . . The unity of the Archipelago itself is derived from the 
interpenetration of land formation and sea areas, and this close 
relationship is reinforced by the presence of ice most of the year.  The 
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geographic unity is further assured by the string of closely spaced 
islands across Parry Channel, linking the northern with the southern 
section and forming a single unit.177 
Having satisfied the threshold geographic requirement, the actual 
construction of the baselines is subjected to further rules.  In the 
Norweigan Fisheries Case, the ICJ formulated three criteria to help 
guide its decision: (1) “[W]hile . . . a State must be allowed the 
latitude necessary in order to be able to adapt its delimitation to 
practical needs and local requirements, the drawing of base-lines 
must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction 
of the coast”178 (the general direction of the coast criterion); (2) “[t]he 
real question raised in the choice of base-lines is in effect whether 
certain sea areas lying within these lines are sufficiently closely 
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal 
waters”179 (the close link between land and sea criterion); (3) 
“[f]inally, there is one consideration not to be overlooked, the scope of 
which extends beyond purely geographical factors: that of certain 
economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of 
which are clearly evidenced by a long usage”180 (the economic 
interests criterion). 
 As evidenced by the European Community’s note of protest, 
Canada’s Arctic baseline system sometimes faces criticism for failing 
to satisfy the first criterion (general direction).181  However, the court 
cautioned in its judgment that this first criterion was “devoid of any 
mathematical precision,”182 and it even specified that “the method of 
base-lines . . . within reasonable limits, may depart from the physical 
line of the coast.”183  Still, as Pharand writes:  
[J]udging from the commonly used Lambert conic projection, it would 
be difficult to maintain that the first criterion of the general direction of 
the coast is complied with.  Indeed, the northern coast of Canada runs 
in a general east-west direction, whereas the Archipelago appears to 
project itself in a general northerly direction.184 
Victor Prescott contends that the general direction criterion is not 
only concerned with the direction of the coast of the mainland and 
islands that dovetail into it.185  He insists that large islands can be 
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fringed by smaller islands and points out that Article 121 of the 1982 
Law of the Sea Convention provides “that baselines for islands are 
determined in exactly the same way as for other land territory.”186  
On this basis, Prescott concludes, “a case could be made that the 
small islands totalling more than 18 000 provide a series of fringes to 
the large islands that interlock.  This would lead irresistibly to the 
conclusion that to draw straight baselines within the archipelago 
rather than around its perimeter would violate the concept of fringing 
islands.”187 
 The second and perhaps better way of evaluating the general 
direction of the baselines in relation to Canada’s northern coast is to 
use a map with fewer distortions than a conic projection.  Pharand 
explains that: 
Although this projection [conic projection] is a considerable 
improvement over the old Mercator, areas in high latitudes still present 
considerable distortions.  Those areas appear larger as one approaches 
the North Pole and seem to point northward in a shape resembling a 
triangle.  Fortunately, the distortion problem was solved in large 
measure on a world map published by the National Geographic Society 
in 1988, projecting the polar regions in a far more realistic manner.  
The map displays the Robinson projection . . . .  Of course, it does not 
pretend to completely solve the problem of representing the globe on a 
flat surface . . . .  In spite of the remaining distortion at high altitude 
[sic], the Archipelago is better represented. It is fully integrated in the 
mainland, and it is oriented east and west in the same general 
direction.188 
The fulfillment of the general direction criterion is even more obvious 
on maps which are centered on the North Pole, with Canada, Alaska, 
Russia, Norway, and Greenland all fringing a suddenly very large 
Arctic Ocean.189  Indeed, Pharand insists that Canada’s baseline 
system meets the stricter test formulated by the United States “that 
the general trend of the most distant islands not deviate more than 
20° from coastline or its general direction.”190  
 As for the second criterion (the close link), “the sea to land ratio 
[in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago] is 0.822 to 1, considerably better 
                                                                                                                      
 186. Id.; UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 121, para. 2. 
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than the 3.5 to 1 ratio” in the case of the Norwegian skaergaard.191  
In the same context, Pharand identifies a second positive factor that 
(at least historically) strengthened Canada’s position: “the quasi-
permanency of the ice over the enclosed water,” which “bolsters the 
physical unity between land and sea.”192  In a speech before the 
Canadian House of Commons in September 1985, Joe Clark, then-
Secretary of State for External Affairs, stressed this second factor: 
Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible.  It embraces land, sea 
and ice. It extends without interruption to the sea-ward facing coasts of 
the Arctic islands.  These islands are joined, and not divided, by the 
waters between them.  They are bridged for most of the year by ice.  
From time immemorial Canada’s Inuit people have used and occupied 
the ice as they have used and occupied the land.193 
The last line of this passage also speaks to the economics interests 
criterion.  The economic interests of the Inuit reinforce Canada’s 
baselines, which are valid under the two compulsory geographic 
criteria.  Indeed, the historic use and occupancy of the sea [and] ice by 
the Inuit help to justify Canada’s baseline system as a whole as well 
as individual baselines.194  Article 7(5) of 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention codifies this third criterion: “Where the method of 
straight baselines is applicable under paragraph 1, account may be 
taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests 
peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of 
which are clearly evidenced by long usage.”195  In the 1951 Norweigan 
Fisheries Case, the ICJ held that this economic criterion included 
“nutritional and cultural dependence.”196  In particular, the Court 
found that “the survival of traditional rights reserved to the 
inhabitants of the Kingdom over fishing grounds . . . . [F]ounded on 
the vital needs of the population and attested by very ancient and 
peaceful usage, may legitimately be taken into account in drawing a 
line.”197 
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 Sea-ice is vital to Inuit culture and way of life.  As detailed in a 
petition concerning climate change filed by Inuit from Canada and 
Alaska with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 
Although many Inuit are [now] engaged in wage 
employment, the Inuit continue to depend heavily on the 
subsistence harvest for food.  Traditional “country food” 
is far more nutritious than imported “store-bought” food.  
Subsistence harvesting also provides spiritual and 
cultural affirmation, and is crucial for passing skills, 
knowledge and values from one generation to the next, 
thus ensuring cultural continuity and vibrancy.  
. . . .   
[The Inuit] have developed an intimate relationship with 
their surroundings, using their understanding of the 
arctic environment to develop a complex culture that has 
enabled them to thrive on scarce resources.  The culture, 
economy and identity of the Inuit as an indigenous 
people depend upon the ice and snow.198 
The economic and cultural dependence of the Inuit on the sea-ice 
from time immemorial is a critical aspect of Canada’s claim over the 
waters of its Arctic Archipelago.  Again, this fact was emphasized in 
the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement concluded in 1993 between the 
Canadian government and the Inuit, which affirms that “Canada’s 
sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago is supported by 
Inuit use and occupancy.”199 
                                                                                                                      
By its very flexible nature, the doctrine of consolidation of title easily 
encompasses the vital interests of the coastal State and its inhabitants . . . . In 
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V.  WAS THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE AN INTERNATIONAL  
STRAIT BEFORE 1986? 
 Although a strong case can be made for the legal validity of 
Canada’s straight baselines and thus for the claim that the waters 
they enclose are Canadian internal waters, the Northwest Passage 
itself may not have the same status.  This is because an existing 
international strait cannot be closed off by new baselines.200  As a 
result, the crux of the dispute between Canada and the United States 
regarding the status of the Northwest Passage concerns the so-called 
“functional criterion” and, specifically, whether the Northwest 
Passage was “used for international navigation” prior to 1986 when 
Canada drew its baselines.201 
 During the negotiations leading to the 1958 Law of the Sea 
Convention, states were unable to agree on a generally acceptable 
legal regime for international straits.202  The issue of straits was also 
quite divisive during the lead-up to the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, pitting coastal States, particularly in the developing 
world, against the maritime powers.203  Although a compromise was 
eventually reached as to the nature and scope of the right of passage 
that would apply to “straits used for international navigation,” the 
negotiators were unable to agree on a precise definition for such 
straits.204  Consequently, it is necessary to rely on existing customary 
international law, particularly as interpreted and applied by the 
International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case.205 
 In its 1949 judgment, the only international ruling on the issue, 
the court had to decide whether the North Corfu Channel was an 
international strait.206  The court arrived at the conclusion that it 
“should be considered as belonging to the class of international 
highways through which passage cannot be prohibited by a coastal 
                                                                                                                      
 200. See UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 35 (provides that nothing in the part 
affects areas of internal waters within a strait). 
 201. See Pharand, supra note 97, at 34–35 (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 
1949 I.C.J. 4, 28 (Apr. 9)). 
 202. See PHARAND, supra note 63, at 89 (describing how a comprehensive set of 
provisions on international straits was not adopted until UNCLOS in 1982). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Part III of UNCLOS essentially incorporated the draft prepared by the 
Private Group on Straits (chaired by the United Kingdom and Fiji) and retained the 
two criteria identified in article 1 of the draft: “This article applies to any strait (which 
term includes any naturally formed stretch of water whatever its geographical name) 
which: (a) is used for international navigation; and (b) connects two parts of the high 
seas.” 4 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOCUMENTS 
194 (Platzöder ed., 1982). 
 205. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
 206. Id. 
2009] Who Controls the Northwest Passage? 1171 
 
State in time of peace.”207  In deciding “whether the test is to be found 
in the volume of traffic passing through the Strait or in its greater or 
lesser importance for the international navigation,” the court stated 
that “the decisive criterion is rather its geographical situation as 
connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being used for 
international navigation.”208 
 It is in this key passage that the court sets out the twin criteria 
that define an international strait: “one pertaining to geography and 
the other to the function or use of the strait,” to borrow Pharand’s 
words.209  The court’s deliberate use of the coordinative conjunction 
“and” seems to give equal weight to both criteria.  
 While no one disputes that the Northwest Passage fulfills the 
geographic criterion by connecting the Atlantic and Arctic oceans, 
there has been considerable debate over the precise meaning ascribed 
to the functional criterion, namely the words “used for international 
navigation.”  Pharand has argued that the expression means that 
“before a strait may be considered international, proof must be 
adduced that it has a history as a useful route for international 
maritime traffic.”210 
 Confirmation for this assessment can be found in the view 
expressed by the United Kingdom in its pleadings in the 1951 
Norwegian Fisheries Case wherein it defined an international strait 
as “any legal strait to which a special régime as regards navigation 
applies under international law because the strait is substantially 
used by shipping proceeding from one part of the high seas to 
another.”211  The International Law Commission’s draft convention 
for the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference similarly confined the right of 
non-suspendable innocent passage to straits “normally used for 
international navigation between two parts of the high seas.”212  
However, the drafters eventually dropped the qualifying adverb 
“normally,” and it does not appear in either the 1958 Territorial Sea 
Convention or the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.213 
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 Pharand speculates that the intent behind the deletion of the 
word “normally” may simply have been to remove the necessity of 
regular use over a very long period.214  In the Corfu Channel Case, 
evidence showed that the British navy had made regular use of the 
waterway for some eighty years.215  Regardless of the precise reasons 
for the removal of the word “normally,” Pharand insists that before a 
strait may be considered international, proof must be presented that 
it is an international maritime highway.216  This conclusion appears 
to accord with the interpretation of the Corfu criteria generally given 
by experts. 
 In 1964, Richard Baxter wrote, “[I]nternational waterways must 
be considered to be those rivers, canals, and straits which are used to 
a substantial extent by the commercial shipping or warships 
belonging to states other than the riparian nation or nations.”217  As 
for the criteria applied by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case, Baxter 
concluded that “the test applied by the court lays more emphasis on 
the practices of shipping than on geographic necessities.”218 
 Daniel O’Connell also emphasized the importance of the “actual 
use” criterion: 
When it is said, then, that a strait in law is a passage of territorial sea 
linking two areas of high sea this is not to be taken literally, but rather 
construed as meaning a passage which ordinarily carries the bulk of 
international traffic not destined for ports on the relevant coastlines.  
The test of what is a strait, unlike the test of what is a bay, is not so 
much geographical, therefore, as functional.219 
O’Connell later reaffirmed the importance of the functional element 
in what is arguably his most authoritative study, The International 
Law of the Sea.220  In his opinion, the Corfu Channel Case established 
“that not all straits linking two parts of the high seas are 
international straits, but only those which are important as 
communication links.”221 
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 215. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 29 (Apr. 9). 
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 In what is arguably the most complete modern study of straits in 
international law, Hugo Caminos concludes: 
 The amount of use required of a strait before it can be categorized as 
“belonging to a class of international highways through which passage 
cannot be prohibited” has never been adequately quantified by 
scholarly debate. One could conclude, however, that this amount lies 
somewhere between strict utility and potential utility.222 
More recently, Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe have considered 
the Northwest Passage, along with the Northern Sea Route, to be 
situations where there is “real doubt” as to whether an international 
strait exists.223  They chose not to analyze the Northwest Passage 
because the dispute between Canada and the United States “was 
circumvented” by the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement, but their 
views on the Northern Sea Route would still seem to be of some 
relevance: “[T]here are doubts as to whether the straits can be said to 
be ‘used for international navigation,’ and thus attract a right of 
transit passage, in the light of the handful of sailings through the 
(often ice-bound) straits that have actually taken place.”224 
 Despite the general view that a certain level of actual use is 
required, voices from within the U.S. military assert that potential 
use is sufficient.  In 1987, Richard Grunawalt of the U.S. Naval War 
College wrote: 
Some nations take the view that an actual and substantial use over an 
appreciable period of time is the test. Others, including the United 
States, place less emphasis on historical use and look instead to the 
susceptibility of the strait to international navigation. The latter view 
has the greater merit.225 
The last sentence is, of course, an opinion rather than an argument. 
 Twenty years later, J.C. Kraska of the U.S. Navy asserted that 
[t]he test is geographic, not functional—if the water connects one part 
of the high seas or EEZ to another part of the high seas or EEZ, it is a 
strait. . . . [T]here is no authority for the idea that a strait is only a 
strait if it meets a certain minimum threshold of shipping traffic.”226 
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The Canadian media described Kraska’s article as having “the full 
backing of the Bush administration in Washington.”227  However, we 
have not been able to find any other country that publicly supports 
the U.S. view.  Yet again, neither customary international law nor 
the only ICJ decision on international straits—the only points of 
reference given that the treaties (1958 and 1982 Conventions) do not 
give a precise definition of an international strait—support the 
“potential use” interpretation. 
 That said, there is still some debate as to the necessary volume 
of traffic.  As Pharand reported, the evidence in the Corfu Channel 
Case showed that it had been a very useful route for ships flagged by 
seven states: Greece, Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, France, Albania, 
and the United Kingdom.228  Over a 21-month period, there were 
some 2,884 crossings, and this figure covered only those ships which 
had put into port and been visited by customs.229  It did not include 
the large number of vessels that had gone through the strait without 
calling at the Port of Corfu.230  “In other words,” concluded Pharand, 
“the actual use of the North Corfu Channel had been quite 
considerable.”231  
 In contrast, Pharand was able to document only sixty-nine 
transits of the Northwest Passage in the century prior to and 
including 2005: twenty small yachts, two tankers, eighteen 
icebreakers, and twenty-nine passenger ships.232  All of the foreign 
vessels, including the two tankers and twenty-nine passenger ships 
that could be classified as international commercial navigation, 
obtained Canada’s prior authorization.233  The only exception was the 
Polar Sea in 1985, which, as we have seen, sailed through the 
Passage under an informal agreement to disagree.234 
 It is thus Canada’s position that the Northwest Passage does not 
fulfill the functional criterion that, together with the geographic 
criterion, defines an international strait.235  By drawing straight 
baselines in 1986, Canada attempted to preclude the possibility that 
                                                                                                                      
 227. Mike Blanchfield, Pentagon Adviser Belittles Canadian Claim to Northwest 
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the Northwest Passage could eventually become an international 
strait.236  And it would have succeeded if the baselines had been 
widely recognized.  However, as noted, Canada’s Arctic baselines 
have not received widespread support from other countries; instead, 
they immediately attracted diplomatic protests from the United 
States and European Community.237  With the legality of the straight 
baselines unresolved, the status of the Northwest Passage remains 
uncertain. Consequently, even if the Northwest Passage was not an 
international strait before 1986, the position asserted by Canada 
when it drew the baselines could, arguably, still be undermined by 
non-consensual voyages that, over time, could turn the Northwest 
Passage into an international strait.238  
 One year before Canada drew its baselines, Pharand warned 
that increased international shipping would probably result in the 
internationalization of the Passage.239  Three years after the 
baselines were drawn, Howson wrote: 
[T]hough at present both the rarity of surface voyages 
and the difficulty of navigation through the ice-bound 
waters keep international maritime navigation away 
from the Northwest Passage, technological advancement 
will soon complement geographic potential.  Indeed, to a 
certain extent, this has already occurred with rapid 
advances in submarine technology.  Under either “actual” 
or “potential” use standards, the Passage is likely to 
become a far more compelling case for the status of an 
“international strait.”240 
These forecasts did not even take into account the subsequent 
sudden, and dramatic loss of sea-ice caused by climate change.  
However, Howson’s comments do touch on an additional, key 
component of the legal puzzle: submarine transits through the 
Northwest Passage. 
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A. Submarines in the Northwest Passage 
 Submarine transits are of central importance to understanding 
the traditional U.S. position on the Northwest Passage.  This is due to 
the Arctic Ocean’s strategic location between the United States and 
Russia and the legal consequences for submarine traffic of regarding 
the Passage as anything other than an international strait.  For 
under the law of the sea, submarines may pass through an 
international strait without surfacing or otherwise alerting the 
adjacent coastal state or states, something not permitted in internal 
or (regular) territorial waters.241 
 Nuclear-powered submarines do not require oxygen for 
propulsion and are therefore not dependent on the straits and 
channels being free of ice.  It is widely known, though infrequently 
officially acknowledged, that submarines from several countries 
regularly traverse the Northwest Passage.242  Publicly, Canada has 
chosen to ignore the issue; it has never possessed a submarine that 
could travel under the ice.  In 1987, two years after the Polar Sea 
incident, the Canadian government decided to acquire ten to twelve 
nuclear-powered submarines that could have done so, but pressure 
from Washington soon led to the abandonment of that plan.243  Nor 
has Canada made any effort to deploy a surface-based anti-submarine 
operation in the area. 
 Arguably, it works in Canada’s favor that the submarines do not 
announce their presence. In international law, a country is generally 
required to manifest some sense of legal obligation or entitlement 
before its actions can contribute to the establishment of a new 
right.244  At the same time, it seems likely that Canada—a NATO ally 
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of Britain, France, and the United States—has known about at least 
some of the submarine voyages and simply kept quiet.245  Such a 
combination of knowledge and acquiescence could prove fatal to 
Canada’s legal position were evidence of it made public, since this 
would establish actual non-consensual usage of the Northwest 
Passage by international shipping.246   
 However, it is just as likely that any U.S. (and probably NATO) 
submarine traffic takes place on a pre-negotiated basis similar to that 
set out in the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement.247  If the 
governments sending submarines through the Passage have already 
agreed with Canada that the voyages are without prejudice to the 
dispute, Canada’s legal position will not be affected.248  It is even 
conceivable that permission has regularly been sought and received—
in which case the voyages, if publicly acknowledged, would actually 
strengthen Canada’s legal position.  But the issue of submarine 
voyages remains off the table, legally speaking, as long as the 
countries involved continue to treat such activity as officially secret—
as it appears they all intend to do. 
 Much more apparent and immediately relevant are the 
environmental risks presented by commercial surface shipping in a 
region where ecosystems are already under acute stress from climate 
change. 
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VI.  PROTECTING THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
 The Arctic marine ecosystem is one of the most fragile on 
Earth.249  Arctic species have features and life cycles that reflect an 
adaptation to life on and under the sea-ice.250  Unique forms of algae 
and bacteria are active below and in cracks between the sea-ice at 
temperatures as low as eight degrees below zero (Fahrenheit).  They 
are fed upon by miniature crustacean which, in turn, are consumed 
by Arctic cod, a species of fish that is able to synthesize antifreeze 
proteins in its blood.251  The cod are in turn preyed upon by ringed 
seals, which give birth and nurse their pups in dens inside sea-ice 
ridges.252  The seals then provide the main food source for two 
dominant predators: polar bears and the Inuit, both of which are 
perfectly adapted to find and kill seals in the whiteness of the pack 
ice.253  The shortness of the food chain, the remarkable specialization 
involved, and the near total reliance on a precarious ice-water 
balance measured in fractions of a degree of temperature all combine 
to make the Arctic marine ecosystem almost uniquely susceptible to 
disruption and destruction.  
 Any shipping involves the danger of accidents, especially in 
remote and incompletely charted waters: An oil spill in the Northwest 
Passage could cause as much damage as the Exxon Valdez and be 
more difficult to clean up.254  Large ships emptying their ballast 
tanks as they enter these shallow waters could introduce destructive 
foreign species, such as fish parasites or poisonous algae, causing 
damage on a scale comparable to what the Zebra Mussel has done to 
North America’s Great Lakes.255  Increased shipping could also 
disturb mating, birthing, or nursing of whales in key habitats such as 
Lancaster Sound at the eastern end of the Northwest Passage.256 
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 The executive summary of the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment 2009 Report underlines these threats to the Arctic 
marine environment:  
The most significant threat from ships . . . is the release of oil through 
accidental or illegal discharge. Additional potential impacts of Arctic 
ships include ship strikes on marine mammals, the introduction of alien 
species, disruption of migratory patterns of marine mammals and 
anthropogenic noise produced from marine shipping activity.257 
The environmental risks are of great concern to the Inuit.  When we 
asked Maria Kripanik, the deputy mayor of Igloolik, about the 
possibility of increased shipping through the Northwest Passage, her 
first thought was for “our animals.”258  The waters of Foxe Basin, she 
explained, are home to beluga whales, ringed seals, and walrus—all 
of which the Inuit depend on for food.259  The Inuit are a maritime 
people, as reflected in the fact that all but one of the communities in 
Nunavut are located on the seacoast. 
 Inuit hunters are not merely concerned about the disruption to 
marine species and their hunting practices that would inevitably 
follow an oil spill.  As the AMSA Report highlights, many local Arctic 
residents depend on marine resources for subsistence and the local 
economy: “[O]ver-the-ice travel and boat transport allow the use of 
large marine areas during much of the year. Such life in the Arctic is 
dependent on movement over the ice and ocean and sea ice is integral 
to this movement.”260 
A. The Need for National Jurisdiction 
 The success of efforts to protect the Inuit and their fragile, 
already stressed environment could depend, in large part, on whether 
the zones being protected fall within Canadian jurisdiction. Most 
efforts at protecting the environment within internationalized zones 
have had limited success. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing has, in the words of one recent report, “proved stubbornly 
resistant to international attempts to control it.”261  Efforts to protect 
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1180  VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 42:1133 
 
and stabilize the atmosphere—the thin, life-giving skin of the 
planet—have proven similarly ineffective, with the atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide increasing from 356 parts per million 
(ppm) in 1992 (when the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change was adopted) to 385 ppm in 2008.262 
 In general, efforts to protect the environment within national 
jurisdictions have a better track record—though political will is still 
necessary, of course.  Canada and the United States have successfully 
cooperated to save the whooping crane and other migratory bird 
species from extinction,263 slow the decline in West Coast salmon 
stocks,264 and protect the biota of trans-boundary lakes and rivers.265  
But they have only been able to do so because of their unquestioned 
authority to regulate activities and enforce compliance within their 
territories and under their own domestic legal systems.266 
 Some experts have focused on multilateral treaties and codes of 
conduct as a way of dealing with the environmental risks posed by 
shipping in the Northwest Passage.267  Such an approach can 
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2009] Who Controls the Northwest Passage? 1181 
 
certainly supplement national powers, but the negotiation of 
multilateral instruments involves a complex balancing of many 
different interests.  In the case of any multilateral instrument dealing 
with Arctic shipping, the result would necessarily be a compromise 
between shipping and coastal states.  As Huebert has explained, “It is 
possible that the IMO [International Maritime Organization] may, 
ultimately, create a set of standards equal to those developed in 
Canada; but, more likely, an internationally established set of 
standards would not be as stringent on such issues as environmental 
protection.”268 
 For the same reason, multilateral instruments often fail to 
provide effective enforcement powers—especially over activities in 
internationalized zones.  The absence of such powers is most evident 
in instruments that are not legally binding, since this precludes 
recourse to adjudication or the adoption of “countermeasures” in the 
event of non-compliance.269  For instance, a group of state 
representatives spent a number of years negotiating a mandatory 
“Polar Code” for shipping under the auspices of the International 
Maritime Organization.270  Before the document was submitted to the 
states parties in 2002, however, it was downgraded to a set of 
guidelines.271  Indeed, one of AMSA’s key findings is that “[t]here are 
no uniform, international standards for ice navigators and for Arctic 
safety and survival for seafarers in polar conditions. And, there are 
no specifically tailored, mandatory environmental standards 
developed by IMO for vessels operating in Arctic waters.”272 
 The delay in adopting the Arctic Code is indicative of another 
problem with multilateral instruments: They often take considerable 
time to negotiate.  With sea-ice disappearing so quickly, time is of the 
essence.  For all these reasons, Canada’s claim that the Northwest 
Passage constitutes Canadian internal waters provides the best 
foundation for effective, enforceable environmental protection. 
 As it happens, environmental protection has always been a 
motivating factor behind Canada’s claim.  The 1970 Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act represents thirty-eight years of asserted 
legislative jurisdiction aimed explicitly at protecting the fragile Arctic 
marine environment from the risks posed by international 
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shipping.273  The AWPPA also provided the stimulus for the 
development of treaty law and customary international law 
supporting the exercise of a heightened degree of regulatory and 
enforcement power by coastal states in ice-covered areas such as the 
Northwest Passage.274  
B. Article 234 and International Straits 
 The adoption of Article 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea was a major success for Canadian diplomacy.  Yet it is 
unclear whether the provision applies in international straits, for the 
negotiators did not expressly deal with the issue.275  Given the 
important role of UNCLOS in developing customary international 
law, the same uncertainty prevails with regard to any parallel 
customary rule.  Arguably, this uncertainty, when combined with the 
environmental imperative behind the rule, creates a presumption 
that ice-covered waterways such as the Northwest Passage are not 
international straits, since an international strait in ice-covered 
waters that was not subject to strict environmental regulation by the 
coastal state would undermine the purpose of both Article 234 and 
any parallel customary rule.276  
 Don McRae goes so far as to argue that the failure of the 
UNCLOS negotiators to deal expressly with the application of Article 
234 to international straits suggests that they did not consider the 
Northwest Passage to fall within this category: 
The ice-covered areas provision also affected a careful compromise on 
the question of the relationship of the Northwest Passage to the 
“international straits” regime under the Convention.  There was no 
express provision for excluding the Northwest Passage from that 
regime, and thus neither the United States nor Canada was required to 
take a position on the matter.  However, the intention of the 
compromise is readily apparent.  The ice-covered areas provision is not 
included in the sections of part XII of the Convention that are subject to 
the international straits regime.  Since the ice-covered areas provision 
clearly applies to the Northwest Passage, and since the ice-covered 
areas provision is not subject to the international straits regime, ergo 
the international straits regime is not applicable to the Northwest 
Passage.277 
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However, the possibility that Article 234 does not apply in 
international straits provides another good reason for supporting 
Canada’s position that the Northwest Passage constitutes Canadian 
internal waters.  The absence of the rights under Article 234, or 
comparable or even stronger rights under domestic law, would 
seriously compromise efforts to protect the maritime environment in 
the Arctic waterway at enormous potential risk to wildlife and the 
Inuit.278 
 Lately, however, Canada has been dragging its heels on the 
environmental protection front.  For over twenty-five years, Canada 
and the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) have discussed designating Lancaster 
Sound, the principal eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage, as a 
World Heritage Site.279  Lancaster Sound is home to endangered 
bowhead whales; most of the world’s narwhals; one third of North 
America’s belugas; walrus; polar bears; ringed, bearded, and harp 
seals; and millions of seabirds.280  Designating Lancaster Sound a 
                                                                                                                      
negotiating states. On intentional ambiguity generally, see Michael Byers, Agreeing to 
Disagree: Security Council Resolution 1441 and Intentional Ambiguity, 10 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 165, 165–86 (2004). 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 263–70. 
 279. As a State Party to the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Canada is required to identify the natural sites 
of outstanding universal value on its territory. Convention Concerning the Protection 
of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage art. 3, Nov. 16, 1972, available at 
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf. However, nominations to the World 
Heritage List are not considered unless the nominated property has previously been 
included on the State Party’s “tentative list” of the properties it intends to consider for 
nomination in subsequent years. State Parties are encouraged to re-examine and re-
submit their tentative list at least every ten years. Under Canada’s original tentative 
list of world heritage sites (1980), Lancaster Sound was included as part of Sirmilik 
National Park of Canada (Nunavut). However, this proposal was subsequently 
abandoned and Lancaster Sound does not at present appear on Canada’s updated 
tentative list of world heritage sites (2004). UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 
Tentative Lists: Canada, http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/state=ca (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2009). The Parks Canada’s website, in its section on world heritage and natural 
sites, does indicate that the Northwest Passage was considered as a potential site for 
the updated tentative list but was ultimately rejected. Parks Canada, Sites Remaining 
on the 1980 Tentative List, http://www.pc.gc.ca/progs/spm-whs/itm4-/page8_E.asp (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2009). There are at present no marine World Heritage Sites in the 
Arctic. UNESCO World Heritage Lists, http://whc.unesco.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). 
For a related proposal to designate Lancaster Sound as a National Marine 
Conservation Area, see Jessen, supra note 256. According to Parks Canada, a national 
marine conservation area proposal for the Lancaster Sound area was prepared in 1987, 
but the feasibility assessment was suspended at the request of the local Inuit. Parks 
Canada, Canada’s National Marine Conservation Areas System Plan: Lancaster 
Sound, http://www.pc.gc.ca/progs/amnc-nmca/systemplan/itm1-/arc6_E.asp (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2009).  
 280. See Artic Institute of North America, Eastern Arctic Marine Environmental 
Studies Program, 35 ARCTIC 1 (1982), available at  http://www.arctic.ucalgary.ca/ 
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World Heritage Site would, among other things, facilitate efforts to 
regulate the routes and frequency of shipping so as to reduce its effect 
on those endangered mammals.281  Even if there is no obligation to 
take such a measure (and, in our view, there probably is not), doing 
so—and having it formally accepted by UNESCO—would support 
Canada’s claim that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal 
waters subject to Canadian regulation and control.282  However, 
successive Canadian governments have never pursued the World 
Heritage Site process to completion, apparently because of concerns 
that doing so might exacerbate the Northwest Passage dispute with 
the United States.283 
 The less controversial, domestic step of designating Lancaster 
Sound as a national marine conservation area—the equivalent of a 
national park—has also been delayed for decades, though Inuit 
concerns about possible limitations on hunting rights are partly 
responsible for this.284  In 2007, the federal government allocated $5 
million for a five-year study of whether such a conservation area 
would be “a practical approach to sustainable management in 
Lancaster Sound.”285  The answer is probably no, since without the 
international recognition that comes with a World Heritage Site 
designation, foreign ships might ignore the domestic environmental 
protections.286  The creation of a national marine conservation area 
should be coupled with a push to secure UNESCO designation, 
                                                                                                                      
index.php?page=arctic_contents (this entire issue of the journal relates to the Eastern 
Arctic Marine Environment Studies Program, with a focus on Lancaster Sound). 
 281. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 258 (discussing the effects of 
shipping on whales). 
 282. One way in which declaring the Northwest Passage a World Heritage Site 
would assist in Canada’s claim is by furthering their argument that the Inuit’s culture 
presents a unique “nutritional and cultural dependence,” furthering support for 
Canada’s “non-historical internal water” claim. See supra text accompanying notes 
194–99.  
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 134–43 (detailing the current fragile 
understanding between the United States and Canada); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 99–106 (demonstrating how Canada’s previous attempts to 
explicitly claim a right to the Northwest Passage have elicited opposition from the 
United States, disrupting the unspoken compromise).  
 284. Parks Canada, supra note 279.  
 285. Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Health of the Oceans Initiatives—A Listing 
by Lead Department or Agency, http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/management-
gestion/healthyoceans-santedesoceans/initiatives-eng.htm#natmarine (last visited Oct. 
9, 2009). 
 286. Compare World Heritage Centre, Funding, Reporting and Monitoring, 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/118/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (detailing the conservation and 
monitoring standards of World Heritage Sites), with Huebert, supra note 248, at 90–92 
(demonstrating foreign treatment of the Northwest Passage when Canada was 
attempting to govern access without international assistance).   
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linking the domestic to the international in a mutually supportive 
way. 
 Another example of Canadian government foot-dragging 
concerns NORDREG, Canada’s maritime registration system in the 
Arctic.287  The parallel systems on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of 
Canada are mandatory, but the system on Canada’s third coast is 
not.288 This discrepancy is apparently the result of concerns that 
making NORDREG mandatory might provoke a negative response 
from the United States.289  Franklyn Griffiths has come to the same 
conclusion, and he has made the useful suggestion that making 
NORDREG mandatory is consistent with contemporary U.S. concerns 
about improving North American security: 
At present, reporting by foreign vessels is voluntary in Canada’s Arctic 
waters and mandatory off the east and west coasts, evidently because of 
Canadian defence to longstanding US sensitivities about the status of 
the Northwest Passage in law.  As a result, Canada does not know as 
much as it should about passengers, cargo, and vessel purposes.  For 
instance, Canadian officials in Resolute do not necessarily have 
passenger and crew lists of transiting vessels to check for security 
purposes and to recheck against passenger lists on the next flights 
south.  Mandatory reporting could, therefore, become part of a 
systematic Canadian effort to tighten security against terrorist and 
other threats in northernmost North America.290 
In August 2008, during a trip to Inuvik, Northwest Territories, 
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that his 
government would in fact be making NORDREG mandatory.291  In 
doing so, he expressly anticipated some diplomatic opposition: “It’ll be 
                                                                                                                      
 287. See Huebert, supra note 248, at 92 (NORDEG is a voluntary not mandatory 
reporting system for vessels that enter the Canadian Arctic waters). For information on 
NORDREG, see Canada Coast Guard, Vessel Traffic Reporting Artic Canada Traffic 
Zone, http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/MCTS/Vtr_Arctic_Canada (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). 
 288. See Huebert, supra note 248, at 92 (explaining NORDREG’s lack of 
enforcement in the Northwest Passage); see also Huebert, supra note 41, at 302–03. 
Should the owners of any ship decide to enter Canadian Arctic waters and 
decide to take a chance, it is possible to do so without the Canadian 
Government being informed. . . . [T]he lack of monitoring by the Canadian 
Government sends the message that it does not place a high concern regarding 
ships entering its northern waters. 
 289. See Huebert, supra note 248, at 90–92 (explaining that the United States 
has previously opposed all previous Canadian efforts to claim the Northwest Passage 
but has not opposed NORDERG so long as it remains voluntary); see also infra text 
accompanying note 290.  
 290. Franklyn Griffiths, The Shipping News: Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty Not on 
Thinning Ice, 58 INT’L J., Spring 2003, at 257, 272. 
 291. Andrew Mayeda, New Arctic Protection Rules Could be a Tough Sell 
Abroad: Harper, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE (Ottawa), Aug. 27, 2008, available at 
http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/features/arcticambitions/story.html?id=f0020a51-
434f-44f6-8408-8c1d18a67c59. 
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interesting to see. I expect that some countries may object,” Harper 
told reporters.292  “I think it ultimately is in everybody’s interest to 
ensure there is some kind of authority in the area, some kind of 
environmental and commercial authority. . . .  We have no particular 
power play here.”293 
 After the announcement, a spokesperson for the U.S. Embassy in 
Ottawa said, “we will be discussing the proposal with Canada. We 
will want to ensure that any enhanced protection of the Canadian 
Arctic marine environment is achieved in a manner that is consistent 
with the international law of the sea.”294  The prime minister has 
delayed instituting his announced regulatory change from that point 
onwards.  
 It is not clear that making NORDREG mandatory would in fact 
challenge the U.S. position that the Northwest Passage is an 
international strait.  As Stuart Kaye explains, Australia obtained 
International Maritime Organization support for a compulsory 
reporting scheme in Torres Strait (between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea) despite that waterway’s undisputed status as an 
international strait. 
 It would seem that compulsory reporting does not amount to a 
restriction preventing vessels from using an international strait, but 
rather it can be construed as a matter relating to international 
navigation.  While not strictly the designation of sea lanes or a traffic 
separation scheme, the reporting procedures are certainly directed 
solely at safety of navigation, and have been approved by the 
“competent international organization” in the manner outlined in 
UNCLOS, Article 41.295 
 The Government of Canada should pursue the support of the 
IMO for a mandatory version of NORDREG and make the change as 
soon as possible. 
                                                                                                                      
 292. Id.  
 293. Id.  
 294. Randy Boswell & Andrew Mayeda, U.S. Concerned with New Canadian 
Shipping Rules in Arctic, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE (Ottawa), Aug. 28, 2008, available 
at http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/features/arcticambitions/story.html?id=ddf03f 
21-1628-4659-aeda-52dfe3635085.  
 295. Stuart Kaye, Regulation of Navigation in the Torres Strait: Law of the Sea 
Issues, in NAVIGATION RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 119, 127 
(Donald R. Rothwell & Sam Bateman eds., Kluwer Law International 2000).  
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VII.  SECURITY CHALLENGES: FROM THE SOVIET UNION 
TO GLOBAL TERRORISM 
 Soviet submarines in the Northwest Passage posed a serious 
security threat to both Canada and the United States during the Cold 
War.296  The ice-covered waterway offered the subs an alternate route 
between the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans—no small attraction given 
the amount of NATO attention paid to the Greenland–Iceland–UK 
gap.297  If Canada and the United States had been able to agree that 
the Northwest Passage was Canadian internal waters, they would 
have had a strong legal basis for excluding the Soviets.  But while it 
was a given that Canada would always allow American vessels 
access, the U.S. Navy was concerned about securing maximum 
freedom of navigation worldwide.298  It worried that recognizing 
Canada’s claim might create a precedent for coastal state control over 
other contested waterways.299  
 In every other respect, the two NATO allies worked closely 
together to counter the Soviets.  They built and operated the Distant 
Early Warning Line, a string of fifty-eight radar stations stretching 
from Alaska to Greenland across the Canadian North and directed at 
Soviet bombers (and, later, intercontinental ballistic missiles).300  It is 
also well known, though not publicly admitted, that they cooperated 
in the deployment of underwater surveillance devices at various 
choke points in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.301  In the early 
1980s, the Department of National Defence received a federal land 
use permit to install a listening device off Skull Point, near the 
weather station at Eureka.302  According to Coast Guard personnel, 
such missions frequently used Canadian icebreakers.303  More 
recently, the Department of National Defence has been working to 
replace and improve these systems through the “Northern Watch 
Technology Demonstration” project, which involves trials of 
                                                                                                                      
 296. Huebert, supra note 41, at 305–06. 
 297. See Rob Huebert, Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security? 6 CAN. MIL. J. 
17, 19–20 (2005–2006) (discussing the details of Soviet use of Northwest Passage 
during the Cold War and Canadian attempts to address the issue).  
 298. Huebert, supra note 41, at 305–06. 
 299. Id.  
 300. See generally RICHARD MORENUS, DEW LINE: DISTANT EARLY WARNING, 
THE MIRACLE OF AMERICA’S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE (1957) (detailing the DEW Line’s 
history and operation). 
 301. This information was obtained by the authors through confidential 
interviews with former Canadian and U.S. officials. 
 302. JOE BALLANTYNE, SOVEREIGNTY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARCTIC: 
SELECTED EXPLORATION PROGRAMS IN THE 1980S, at 8 (2009). 
 303. This information was obtained by the authors through confidential 
interviews with Canadian government officials.  
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underwater and land-based sensors at Gascoyne Inlet on the north 
shore of Barrow Strait, halfway through the Northwest Passage.304 
 The submarine threat still exists today, but it pales in 
comparison to concerns about “rogue states” and terrorist groups 
using the Northwest Passage to traffic in weapons of mass 
destruction, equipment for enriching nuclear isotopes, and 
missiles.305  Unlikely as these risks might seem at first, it is not 
difficult to imagine a captain in charge of this kind of cargo choosing 
an ice-free, under-policed Northwest Passage over a closely 
scrutinized Panama Canal. For this reason, transnational criminal 
activity and other threats from non-state actors were central to an 
“Arctic Capabilities Study” conducted by the Canadian Directorate of 
Defence in 2000.306  
 Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 
September 11, 2001, concerns about global terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction (WMDs) have greatly increased.  In 2003, the 
United States led the creation of the Proliferation Security 
Initiative.307  This cooperative exercise has seen more than sixty 
countries commit to using their existing rights under international 
law—within their ports, territorial seas, and on ships carrying their 
flags—to prevent the use of the high seas as an avenue for 
proliferating WMDs.308  Canada is one of the participating countries. 
 An ice-free Northwest Passage could also serve as an entry point 
into North America for drugs, guns, illegal immigrants, and perhaps 
even terrorists.  Dozens of gravel airstrips are scattered along the 
waterway, a forgotten legacy of the Cold War and countless research 
                                                                                                                      
 304. Defence Research and Development Canada, Northern Watch Technology 
Demonstration—Project Overview http://www.ottawa.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/html/project_ 
overview-eng.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). 
 305. Michael Byers, Wanted: Mid-Sized Icebreakers, Long-Range Choppers, 
Perspective, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 11, 2009; see also ELINOR C. SLOAN, 
SECURITY AND DEFENCE: IN THE TERRORIST ERA 80 (2005) (discussing Canada’s need to 
increase surveillance of the Arctic due to potential terrorist threats); Jim Brown, Ex-
U.S. Envoy Backs Canada’s Arctic Claim, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 20, 2007, at A17 
(acknowledging the threat in the Northwest Passage).  
 306. The report outlines various techniques to increase surveillance of the 
Northwest Passage and other Arctic regions in an effort to react to the increased 
accessibility of the Arctic region. CANADIAN DIRECTORATE OF DEFENCE, ARCTIC 
CAPABILITIES STUDY, 2, 17–18, (2001), available at http://www.natice.noaa.gov/icefree/ 
Arctic%20Study%20Final%20-%20Canada1.pdf. 
 307. U.S. Dep’t of State, Proliferation Security Initiative Homepage, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).  
 308. Id. For more background information on the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, see Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security 
Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 526, 526–45 (2004). 
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and prospecting expeditions.309  It would be relatively easy to transfer 
passengers or cargo from an ocean-going vessel to a small plane for 
transfer to another small airstrip further south.  Each summer, 
cruise ships put hundreds of undocumented foreign nationals on 
shore at communities such as Pangnirtung, Pond Inlet, Grise Fjord, 
and Resolute Bay, which have scheduled air service but no 
immigration controls.310 
 Stories of attempted illegal entries abound in Canada’s Arctic.  
In 1999, the Chinese research icebreaker MV Xuě Lóng arrived 
unannounced in Tuktoyaktuk.311  When some of the scientists wanted 
to come ashore, an immigration officer had to fly up from Yellowknife 
to process them.312  In September 2006, a Romanian man sailed a 
small motorboat from Greenland to Grise Fjord on Ellesmere Island, 
hoping to fly from there to Toronto.313  The next month, two Turkish 
sailors jumped ship at Churchill, Manitoba, and bought train tickets 
to Winnipeg.314  There is even a regular charter flight from Frankfurt 
to Whitehorse that requires the occasional deportation back to 
Germany from the Yukon.315 
 Having the Northwest Passage recognized as Canadian internal 
waters would facilitate efforts to prevent the illegal entry of people 
and goods into North America.  Within internal waters, the full force 
of the coastal state’s immigration, customs, and criminal laws apply, 
and foreign vessels, crews, passengers, and cargo can be closely 
scrutinized.316  Cargo manifests and crew and passenger lists can be 
required in advance, as can visas, in the same manner as on land. 
 In contrast, the right of transit passage has almost absolute 
precedence in an international strait.  Under the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, the coastal state may adopt laws concerning “the 
loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person in 
contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws 
                                                                                                                      
 309. See Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, http://www.asrc.com/lands/ 
lands.asp?page=entry (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (provides a list of gravel airstrips that 
are closed to public access).  
 310. Byers, supra note 305.  
 311. Huebert, supra note 248, at 87.  
 312. See id. (explaining that local officials in Canada were surprised when the 
Chinese research vessel arrived). 
 313. Don Martin, Invisible Force in the North; Rangers Guard Sovereignty With 
Old Guns, Radios, NAT’L POST (Ontario), Oct. 26, 2007, at A5. 
 314. Joe Friesen, Ship-Jumping Sailors Spook Arctic Port, GLOBE & MAIL 
(Toronto), Oct. 30, 2006, at A13. 
 315. See Condor Airlines, Flight Search, http://www9.condor.com/tcf-us/index.jsp 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2009) (showing flights from Frankfurt to Whitehorse). Additional 
information was obtained by the authors through a confidential interview with a 
Canadian immigration official. 
 316. See UNCLOS, supra note 59, art 2 (implying that a coastal state has 
complete sovereignty over its internal waters).   
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and regulations.”317  Yet even these laws “shall not discriminate in 
form or in fact among foreign ships or in their application have the 
practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of 
transit passage as defined.”318  These limitations are significant, 
especially for a coastal state seeking to address threats posed by 
covert, highly sophisticated groups such as drug cartels and Al-
Qaeda. 
 In an interview with the Canadian Press wire service in October 
2004, then-U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci focused on the security 
aspect and admitted that U.S. opposition to the Canadian claim over 
the Northwest Passage was not immutable: “We are looking at 
everything through the terrorism prism. . . .  Our top priority is to 
stop the terrorists. So perhaps when this . . . is brought to the table 
again, we may have to take another look at this.”319 
 Later, on March 9, 2005, Cellucci himself wrote on the U.S. 
Embassy website: 
This has been a longstanding disagreement between the 
United States and Canada.  However I was asked the 
question at the University of Western Ontario by a 
student who said, would it not be in the security interests 
of North America for the Northwest Passage to be 
considered part of Canada and not international waters 
because then Canada could keep better track of the 
vessels traveling through its waters?  I thought the 
young man had an excellent question and I have asked 
people at the State Department to take a look at this, 
particularly because we do live in the age of the terrorist 
threat.  So it’s not a decision for me to make but I have 
recommended that we take a serious look at our 
longstanding policy.320  
We thus know that the State Department has been re-examining the 
U.S. position.  On October 30, 2006, Cellucci—by this point no longer 
U.S. ambassador—went further, expressing what was clearly his 
personal opinion.321  At a conference in Ottawa, he said, “It is in the 
security interests of the United States that it [the Northwest 
                                                                                                                      
 317. Id. art. 42. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Greg Younger-Lewis, U.S. Might Be Safer if it Left Northwest Passage to 
Canada: U.S. Ambassador, CAN. PRESS NEWSWIRE (Toronto), Oct. 7, 2004. 
 320. North of Sixty: US Virtual Presence Posts in Canada, Online dialogue with 
Ambassador Cellucci (Mar. 9. 2005), http://www.canadanorth.usvpp.gov/yukon/ 
chat.asp. 
 321. Daniel Leblanc, U.S. Reasserts its Position on Northwest Passage, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Toronto), Nov. 1, 2006, at A4. 
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Passage] be under the control of Canada.”322  We will return to this 
important point in the conclusion of this Article. 
VIII.  CANADA’S ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITY IN  
THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE 
 For Canada and the United States, shared security concerns 
necessitate a real and effective presence in the Northwest Passage.  
For Canada, environmental concerns contribute to the same 
imperative, as does the need to provide search-and-rescue, navigation 
assistance, and icebreaking for commercial vessels. Canada also 
needs to be present to prevent unauthorized crossings by foreign 
vessels, since any such voyages would weaken its legal claim, a 
consequence detrimental to itself, the United States, other 
responsible countries, and reputable shipping companies. 
 Yet Canada is poorly equipped to police the Northwest Passage.  
Despite the effects of climate change, the Coast Guard’s relatively 
light icebreakers still cannot operate in the Northwest Passage in 
winter; they are redeployed to the Gulf of St. Lawrence each 
autumn.323  The ships are also growing old: The largest ship, the 
Louis S. St. Laurent, was built in 1967, and the Amundsen is just a 
decade younger.324  
 In 1985, after the voyage of the Polar Sea, the Canadian 
government announced that it would build a powerful, all-season 
icebreaker, the Polar 8.325  However, four years later it cancelled the 
contract, citing the need for fiscal restraint.326  Despite subsequent 
                                                                                                                      
 322. Id. Cellucci repeated the point on August 19, 2007 in an interview with 
CTV’s Question Period: “I think, in the age of terrorism, it’s in our security interests 
that the Northwest Passage be considered part of Canada,” he said. “That would enable 
the Canadian navy to intercept and board vessels in the Northwest Passage to make 
sure they’re not trying to bring weapons of mass destruction into North America.” Jim 
Brown, supra note 305. 
 323. For information on the Canadian Coast Guard’s icebreaking program, see 
Canadian Coast Guard, http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/ice-gla/main_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 
2009). 
 324. Beaufort Gyre Exploration Project, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 
http://www.whoi.edu/beaufortgyre/icebreaker.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009); CCGS 
Admundsen: Canadian Research Icebreaker, http://www.amundsen.quebec-
ocean.ulaval.ca/amundsenenglish.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).  
 325. Randy Boswell, Short-Sighted Politics, Forgotten Arctic Dreams; The 
Abandoned Polar 8 Icebreaker Ship Could Have Embodied Canada’s Identity as a 
Circumpolar Power, OTTAWA CITIZEN, August 10, 2007, at A5. 
 326. Id. (“[I]n February 1990, Mr. Mulroney's finance minister, Michael Wilson, 
announced the death of Canada's polar ship of state, declaring it strategically obsolete 
and economically unjustified.”). 
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years of federal surpluses, the government has not built any new 
icebreakers in the following two decades.327 
 In November 2005, then-Opposition Leader Stephen Harper 
seized on Arctic sovereignty as an election issue.  He promised three 
armed heavy icebreakers, a deep-water port on Baffin Island, 
underwater sensors, and Arctic-trained paratroopers.328  To his 
credit, he has followed up on several of these promises and has taken 
some unexpected steps as well.329 
 The first unexpected step came in May 2006, when the functions 
of the bilateral U.S.–Canada North American Aerospace Defence 
Command were expanded to include surveillance over maritime 
approaches and “internal waterways.”330  During the House of 
Commons debate on the matter, then-Defence Minister Denis 
O’Connor was asked whether the Northwest Passage was included 
                                                                                                                      
 327. Id.  
22 years after former foreign affairs minister Joe Clark committed to spending 
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throughout the entire Arctic region. 
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sooner rather than later, CAN. GEOGRAPHIC, Mar.-Apr. 2006, available at 
http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/magazine/ma06/indepth/place_ sidebar.asp.  
 329. Harper Announces Northern Deep-Sea Port, Training Site, CBC NEWS, Aug. 
11, 2007, available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/08/10/port-north.html.  
 330. Agreement on the North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S.-
Can., Apr. 28, 2006, available at http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte. 
asp?id=105060; see also National Defence and the Canadian Forces, NORAD, 
Backgrounder, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvell 
es-eng.asp?id=1922 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (providing background of NORAD). 
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within the proposed new arrangement.331  O’Connor initially 
indicated that it was not, but he rose the next week on a point of 
order to correct the assertion.332  
 The public agreement to share maritime surveillance within the 
Northwest Passage reinforces a longstanding practice.  Again, it is 
well known, though not publicly acknowledged, that acoustic devices 
were placed in the waterway during the Cold War, with full Canadian 
cooperation.333  The fact that Canada is now developing its own 
acoustic capabilities reflects the age of those existing devices rather 
than any falling out between the two countries.334  Indeed, it is 
possible that the development of a purely Canadian capability was 
what prompted the expansion of the NORAD agreement. 
 The second unexpected step came in July 2007, when Stephen 
Harper announced that six to eight ice-strengthened Arctic Offshore 
                                                                                                                      
 331. 15 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES (HANSARD) 1870, 39th Parl., 1st Sess. 
(daily ed. May 3, 2006) (statement of Godon O’Connor, Minister of Defense) (Can.), 
available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?pub=hansard& 
mee=16&parl=39&sess=1&language=E&Docid=2174969&File=0. 
 332. 16 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES (HANSARD) 1455, 39th Parl.,1st Sess. 
(daily ed. May 3, 2006) (statement of Gordon O’Connor, Minister of Defense) (Can.), 
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/016_2006-05-
04/HAN016-E.htm, Mr. O’Connor stated: 
Mr. Speaker, in the Norad agreement we will share information about vessels 
going through the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway. We will not for 
the Northwest Passage or for our lakes or waters. Those are all our internal 
waters. We do not share that with the United States. 
Id. 18 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES (HANSARD) 1500, 39th Parl.,1st Sess. (daily ed. 
May 8, 2006) (Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/chambus/house/ 
debates/018_2006-05-08/HAN018-E.htm. O’Connor stated: 
Mr. Speaker, I would like to clarify the remarks I made in question period on 
Thursday, May 4. My remarks were in response to a question about Norad’s 
information sharing. The maritime aspect of the agreement will give Norad 
access to data that has been shared between security and defence agencies in 
North America for several decades. This applies to all Canadian and U.S. 
waters, including internal waters. Therefore, Canadian internal waters in the 
Arctic archipelago would also be covered by this agreement. This is nothing 
new. We already share this type of information with the U.S. The Norad 
agreement will allow us to better manage this activity. In no way will this 
provision weaken our sovereignty. Any decision about action in Canadian 
internal waters will remain Canada’s alone. 
Id. 
 333. This information was obtained by the authors through confidential 
interviews with former Canadian and U.S. officials. 
 334. Peter Calamai, Keeping Tabs on the Arctic: As the North Becomes 
Increasingly Accessible, Stakeholders Focus on How to Control It, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 
16, 2007, at A6. 
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Patrol Ships would be built for the Canadian Navy.335  The ships will 
have some protection against ice, but they are not designed to break 
it and, for this reason, will not be deployed in the Northwest Passage 
for most of each year.336  They will, however, be useful in the Gulf of 
St. Lawrence, on the Great Lakes, and even in Hudson Bay and 
Baffin Bay.  A senior Canadian Forces officer has confirmed that the 
military regards the patrol vessels primarily as replacements for the 
existing Kingston class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels used on 
Canada’s Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, which have no ice-
strengthening at all.337 
 In August 2007,  Harper announced that an existing deepwater 
wharf at a disused lead and zinc mine at Nanisivik, on northern 
Baffin Island, would be refurbished to provide an enhanced refuelling 
facility for Canadian naval and Coast Guard vessels close to the 
Northwest Passage.338  Political leaders in Nunavut, who had lobbied 
hard for a similar facility at Iqaluit, on southern Baffin Island, in 
order to boost economic development and reduce the high cost of 
living there, met the decision with dismay.339 
 The Prime Minister also announced an expansion of the 
Canadian Ranger program to 5,000 personnel.340  The program 
currently includes 4,100 part-time reservists—many of them Inuit, 
Inuvialuit, or First Nations—who live in 165 hamlets stretching from 
Baffin Island to the Alaskan frontier.341  The Rangers, who are 
equipped with snowmobiles and old, reliable bolt-action rifles, fulfill 
essential search-and-rescue and surveillance functions close to where 
they live.342  They also teach regular Canadian Forces personnel how 
to survive and travel on the land, especially in winter, and sometimes 
                                                                                                                      
 335. Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Can., Speech at Esquimalt, B.C. (July 9, 
2007), available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1741. 
 336. David Pugliese, Tories to Spend $3.1B on Arctic Fleet, OTTAWA CITIZEN, 
July 10, 2007, at A1. 
 337. DVD: Captain (N) Serge Bertrand, Chief of Staff, Maritime Staff 
Headquarters, Presentation at U.N.T.D. Rendezvous Ottawa, Senate of Canada (Oct. 
20, 2007) (on file with authors). 
 338. See Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Can., Speech at Resolute Bay, Nun. 
(Aug. 10, 2007), available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1787. 
 339. John Thompson, Deep Port Moving Closer to Reality? NUNATSIAQ NEWS, 
Feb. 3, 2006, available at http://www.nunatsiaqnews.com/archives/60203/news/ 
nunavut/60203_03.html; Chris Windeyer, It’s Official: Nanisivik New Port Site, 
NUNATSIAQ NEWS, Aug. 17, 2007, available at http://www.nunatsiaq.com/archives/ 
2007/708/70817/news/nunavut/70817_414.html. 
 340. Harper, supra note 338. 
 341. See Canadian Rangers, http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/cr-rc/index-
eng.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (providing general information on the Canadian 
Rangers). 
 342. See Canadian Rangers, FAQ, http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/cr-
rc/faq-eng.asp#02 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (explaining what Canadian Rangers do and 
what equipment they are provided). 
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lead them on sovereignty ops across the ice and tundra.343  However, 
the expanse in which the Rangers operate dwarfs their abilities, and 
they are neither equipped nor trained to forcibly board ocean-going 
vessels. 
 The most significant contribution the Harper government has 
made to Arctic sovereignty concerns a remote sensing satellite, 
Radarsat-2.  The satellite, owned by MacDonald Dettwiler and 
Associates (MDA, a private Canadian-owned company), was launched 
from Kazakhstan in December 2007.344  Canadian taxpayers were the 
primary source of funding for the satellite, which generates high 
definition imagery on demand, even at night and through clouds.345  
Radarsat-2, designed specifically with the Arctic in mind, is useful for 
monitoring crops and forests, coordinating disaster relief operations, 
and supporting fisheries enforcement.346  In a polar orbit 500 miles 
above the Earth’s surface, it is the perfect tool for tracking ships, 
mapping sea-ice (including during the long, dark polar winter), and 
even—rumor has it—detecting the wakes of submerged 
submarines.347 
 Radarsat-2 was not, however, an initiative of the Harper 
government, having been built and funded during the Liberal 
government of Jean Chrétien.348  Moreover, there are possible 
constraints on Canada’s use of the satellite, including an unpublished 
“annex” to a bilateral treaty that was concluded in 2000 after the 
United States expressed concern that hostile countries or groups 
might be able to purchase revealing images of its military facilities 
                                                                                                                      
 343. See Canadian Rangers, supra note 341 (describing the tasks of Canadian 
Rangers). 
 344. B. Constantineau, MDA Breathes Easy with Satellite Launch, VANCOUVER 
SUN, Dec. 15, 2007, available at http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/ 
business/story.html?id=bceb32a3-3104-44d1-91e9-5ffd8a881297. 
 345. See id. (discussing how much was spent on satellite and its improvements 
on previous satellites). 
 346. Canadian Space Agency, Radarstat-2 Applications, http://www.espace.gc.ca/ 
asc/eng/satellites/radarsat2/applications.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). 
 347. This information was obtained by the authors through a confidential 
interview with an MDA employee. 
 348. See Canadian Library and Archives, First Among Equals: The Prime 
Minister in Canadian Life and Politics, http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/ 
premiersministres/h4-3000-e.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (listing former Prime 
Minister Chretien’s time in office as being from November 4, 1993 to December 12, 
2003); Canadian Space Agency, Canadian Space Milestones, http://www.asc-
csa.gc.ca/eng/about/milestones.asp#1998, (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (detailing the 
timeline of RADARSAT-2’s development, beginning February 27, 1998 when the 
Canadian Space Agency selected a private company to build the satellite and invested 
$225 million into the program). 
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and forces.349  Washington undoubtedly obtained control of any 
images of U.S. bases and real or potential theatres of operation, such 
as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.350  It may also have secured the 
power to conscript Radarsat-2 in support of its intelligence and 
military operations. 351 
 In January 2008, MDA announced plans to sell its space 
division, including Radarsat-2, to Alliant Techsystems of 
Minnesota.352  The proposed sale, and its possible effects on Canada’s 
ability to obtain fine imagery of the Northwest Passage on demand, 
sparked a firestorm of criticism in Canada.353  In response, the 
Harper government extended by thirty days the period for 
considering the proposed sale under the Investment Canada Act—
and then blocked the sale.354  
 In February 2008, more than two years after Harper promised 
three new icebreakers, an item appeared in the Canadian federal 
budget for a large and powerful $720 million icebreaker.355  Rather 
than being a naval vessel, the new icebreaker is destined for the 
Coast Guard, which uses its ships as multipurpose platforms: to clear 
paths for other ships; maintain navigation devices; provide search 
and rescue; support research scientists; and assist in the enforcement 
of fishing and environmental regulations as well as immigration, 
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THE ACTIVIST, Mar. 2006, available at http://activistmagazine.com/ 
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 350. Id. 
 351. MICHAEL BYERS, INTENT FOR A NATION: WHAT IS CANADA FOR? 183–88 
(2007).  
 352. Steven Chase, Deal Includes Key Satellite, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 
10, 2008, at B1. 
 353. See Scott Brison & Michael Byers, Keep Radarsat-2 in Canada, NATIONAL 
POST, March 24, 2008, at A11(discussing why sale is a bad idea); Editorial, Keep Our 
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WALRUS (Toronto), June 2008, available at http://www.walrusmagazine.com/ 
articles/2008.06-technology-for-sale-arctic-sovereignty-radarsat-mda-michael-byers/ 
(explaining why taking an extra 30 days was a good idea); Andrew Mayeda & Randy 
Boswell, Part 2: Tough Talks into National Pride, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 16, 
2008, available at  http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/features/arcticambitions/ 
story.html?id=352b8bf7-b6b3-46a3-8334-29712adb43ce (explaining that the sale was 
ultimately blocked).  
 355. Bob Weber, Budget’s ‘Anywhere, Anytime’ Icebreaker Welcomed, If It Gets 
Built: Experts, EAST OTTAWA STAR, Feb. 27, 2008, available at 
http://www.eastottawa.ca/article-cp97865034-Budgets-anywhere-any-time-icebreaker-
welcomed-if-it-gets-builtexperts.html. 
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customs, and criminal laws.356  However, the icebreaker is not due to 
be operational until 2017, by which point the latest scientific 
projections suggest the Arctic may already have experienced a 
complete summer melt-out of sea-ice.357  As a result, the main 
obstacle to shipping—thick, hard “multi-year” ice—will have 
disappeared. From that point onwards, the Northwest Passage will 
resemble the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where mid-sized icebreakers are 
sufficient, and the planned vessel may be overkill. 
 Surprisingly, the Harper government has paid almost no 
attention to the military’s most important function in the Arctic, 
namely search-and-rescue.  Four old, slow Twin Otter aircraft based 
in Yellowknife constitute the entirety of the Canadian Forces Arctic 
fleet. C-130 Hercules cargo planes based in Trenton, Ontario, used for 
most of the serious search-and-rescues, take six hours to reach the 
Northwest Passage and, once there, can only drop search-and-rescue 
technicians (SAR-techs), rather than hoist anyone on board.358  “None 
of the Canadian Forces’ Cormorant search-and-rescue helicopters is 
Arctic-based, not even in summer.”359  Helicopters have to be 
deployed on specific missions from southern locations, as was the case 
in February 2007, when an aircraft from Comox, in southwestern 
British Columbia, flew thousands of miles to rescue an Inuvialuit 
hunter trapped on an ice-flow at the western end of the Northwest 
Passage.360  
 Increased shipping will likely result in an increased number of 
accidents, many of them in isolated locations and cold temperatures.  
Cruise ships are a particular concern because of the large number of 
older passengers often on board. When the German-owned Hanseatic 
went aground near Cambridge Bay in 1996, all of the passengers had 
to be evacuated. 361  In November of 2007, the Canadian-owned M/V 
                                                                                                                      
 356. Canadian Coast Guard, Our Fleet, http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/CCG/ 
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 357. David Shukman, Arctic to be ‘Ice-free’ in Summer, BBC NEWS, Oct. 14, 
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 358.  Michael Byers, Professor and Can. Research Chair of the University of 
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Explorer sank during an Antarctic voyage after hitting a small 
iceberg; fortunately, the sea was calm, two other cruise ships were 
close by, and all the crew and passengers survived.362  The M/V 
Explorer, a frequent visitor to Arctic waters, could just as easily have 
sunk in the Northwest Passage in rough seas with no help within 
hours or days. 
 Search-and-rescue is also needed for airplane accidents, some of 
which could require large-scale deployment.  In 1991, a Canadian 
Forces Hercules crashed twelve miles from Canadian Forces Station 
Alert on Ellesmere Island, killing five of the eighteen passengers and 
crew.363  The thirteen survivors endured two days in a raging blizzard 
before a search-and-rescue team from southern Canada could reach 
them.364  More than 90,000 commercial flights take “trans-polar” or 
“high latitude” routes over Canadian territory each year.365  The 
prospect of a Boeing 777 or Airbus A-340 crash-landing in the High 
Arctic is terrifying, even if the reliability of such aircraft means the 
risk is very low. 
 Improving search-and-rescue capacity in the Northwest Passage 
would also facilitate the enforcement of Canadian laws and thus the 
credibility of Canada’s legal position.  A long-range helicopter is the 
perfect platform for boarding ocean-going cargo vessels.  Basing one 
or more of these aircraft in the North, initially during the summer 
months, would constitute an important part of any serious policy 
aimed at enforcing Canada’s Northwest Passage claim.  As Pharand 
told Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, 
“[T]he United States will never agree to recognize our full control 
over those waters unless they know that we have the capability to 
exercise that control, which we do not have at the moment.”366  
Indeed, from a U.S. perspective, Canadian sovereignty combined with 
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a lack of enforcement capacity might be worse than a waterway that 
was wide-open to all.  For in an international strait, the United 
States could at least exert a military presence and, based on the 
inherent right of self-defense, interdict vessels posing an imminent 
threat to itself or its citizens.367  
 A demonstrated Canadian commitment to policing the 
Northwest Passage—in the form of actual equipment, infrastructure, 
and personnel—is a necessary part of any diplomatic effort to resolve 
the legal dispute.  Prime Minister Harper has made promises that 
could help take Canada there; now, his government needs to deliver—
including by initiating discussions with Washington. 
IX.  DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS 
 There are experts who believe that it would not be in Canada’s 
interest to press its Northwest Passage claim.368  Franklyn Griffiths 
argues that Ottawa and Washington could just muddle through, 
disagreeing on the law but cooperating on the practicalities of North 
American defense and economic development.369  Indeed, he suggests 
that the United States’ willingness to acquiesce to a de facto increase 
in Canadian control—a consequence of greater concern for homeland 
security and continental defence offsetting the historical need for 
naval mobility in distant regions—might be undermined by an 
attempt to open negotiations on the matter, since this would be to 
“pick a fight with the U.S. Navy.”370  He even posits that 
third parties are unlikely to challenge Canada over the enforcement of 
Canadian environmental and other laws on foreign commercial vessels 
in the Archipelago.  The third party that took Canada to the World 
Court would offer a challenge not only Canada, but also the U.S.  This 
it would do in threatening to breach the North American security 
perimeter by urging an adjudication that ran an international strait 
through the northernmost part of the continent.371 
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This is an optimistic view for a number of reasons.  First, rising 
temperatures and energy prices seem destined to make the 
Northwest Passage an important shipping route—including all the 
environmental and security challenges this will bring.  Second, the 
U.S. Navy is sometimes amenable to changing its positions, as 
demonstrated by the fact that it now supports U.S. ratification of the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.372  Third, it is not clear that 
all third parties will engage in complex calculations of U.S. interests 
or defer to them.  Neighbours and allies might be willing to cooperate 
while agreeing to disagree, but what about North Korea or Al-Qaeda?  
Fourth, adjudication is not the only way that Canada’s position could 
be lost.  One also needs to ask whether the United States and other 
countries would look the other way if Canada interdicted a cargo 
ship—flying a flag of convenience—that entered the Passage without 
permission.  Just a handful of protests, particularly from countries 
with special interests in the Arctic, could seriously damage Canada’s 
claim. 
 Other experts, including some within the Canadian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, argue that the status of 
the Northwest Passage is not so important because, even if it were an 
international strait, Canada already enjoys all the rights and 
privileges needed for responsible stewardship.373  There are several 
strands to this argument, all of which are problematic.  First, it is 
sometimes suggested that, although Canadian jurisdiction within the 
Northwest Passage may be limited by the international straits 
regime, it is not so limited in the approaches to the waterway—where 
the full force of Article 234 of UNCLOS and the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act applies.374  However, this suggestion 
conflicts with the official U.S. government position that “transit 
passage also applies in the approaches to international straits.”375  It 
also seems inconsistent with common sense, since the right of transit 
passage within an international strait would be rendered 
meaningless if a different, more stringent legal regime applied to the 
approaches. 
 Second, the argument sidesteps the question of whether Article 
234 will apply to waters that, while once ice-covered for most of the 
year, are progressively rendered ice-free for many months on end.  
There is nothing in Article 234 to suggest that waters that are subject 
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to greater pollution prevention jurisdiction, because they are covered 
with ice for most of the year, retain that status if and when the ice 
disappears for lengthy periods.376  The rights accorded under Article 
234 are not vested in the strait itself on an indeterminable basis but 
flow from the character of the ocean’s surface there.377 
 Third, the argument does not address the issues of whether (1) 
Article 234 allows Canada to interdict a vessel that is non-compliant 
with the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act; or (2) enforcement 
powers are restricted to the period after a pollution incident occurs.  
Hugh Caminos’ discussion of the application of Article 233—a 
provision which allows for a more limited degree of pollution 
prevention jurisdiction in non-ice covered waters—to international 
straits illustrates the seriousness of the issue:  
 In order for a State bordering a strait to take any enforcement 
measures under Article 233, there must first be a direct nexus between 
the transiting vessels’ violation of Article 42(1)(a) or (b), and the 
resulting major damage to the marine environment of the strait in 
question.  The mere fact [that] a State’s laws and regulations enacted 
pursuant to Article 42 have been breached, does not ipso facto entitle 
that State to act under Article 233.  If actual damage to the marine 
environment has already resulted, and it can be linked to a vessel’s 
illegal actions, then the “States bordering the straits may take 
appropriate enforcement measures.”378 
Mary George comes to an even more restrictive conclusion, arguing 
that “transit passage cannot be interfered with and . . . appropriate 
enforcement measures cannot be imposed on user States when in 
breach of a strait State pollution regulation.”379 
 There is similar uncertainty as to the extent of legislative and 
enforcement jurisdiction a coastal state can exercise in an 
international strait for national security reasons.  Although Article 39 
of UNCLOS states that ships and aircraft, while exercising the right 
of transit passage, shall “refrain from any threat or use of force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of States bordering the strait” and “from any activities other than 
those incidental to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious 
transit,” nowhere does the Convention specify what the coastal state 
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may do in the event of such action.380  To the contrary, Article 44 
simply stipulates that “States bordering straits shall not hamper 
transit passage and shall give appropriate publicity to any danger to 
navigation or overflight within or over the strait of which they have 
knowledge. There shall be no suspension of transit passage.”381 As 
Stuart Kaye has rightly concluded, “Coastal State rights applicable to 
transiting vessels are very limited.”382 
 The Proliferation Security Initiative does not deal with the issue 
of international straits at all, thus implicitly suggesting that they are 
to be treated as high seas for its purposes.  The PSI “statement of 
interdiction principles” calls upon PSI participants to 
take appropriate actions to . . . stop and/or search in their internal 
waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels 
that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes [of WMD, their 
delivery systems, or related materials] to or from states or non-state 
actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are 
identified.383 
Again, the new challenges arising in the Northwest Passage due to 
climate change can only adequately and definitively be addressed by 
applying the full range and rigour of a domestic legal system’s 
environmental, immigration, customs, and criminal laws.  As it 
happens, the Canadian domestic legal system is the only national 
legal system plausibly available within the waters of the Canadian 
archipelago. The Canadian government should therefore initiate 
negotiations with other countries—particularly the United States—
aimed at securing widespread recognition of this reality.  Any other 
approach entails risks that cannot responsibly be tolerated, even if it 
has the short term attraction of requiring little or nothing in terms of 
policy change. 
X.  U.S. NAVIGATION INTERESTS  
 The interests of the United States in the Northwest Passage 
have changed.  Today, Washington is less concerned about Russian 
submarines than about terrorists finding a backdoor to North 
America or rogue states using the oceans to transport missiles and 
WMD.  In the Arctic, these new threats would best be dealt with by a 
strengthened Canadian military and Coast Guard applying the full 
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force of Canadian domestic law.  It simply does not benefit the United 
States—nor other responsible countries and reputable shipping 
companies—to have foreign vessels shielded from scrutiny and 
reasonable regulations by maintaining that the Northwest Passage is 
an international strait.  
 Access to the waterway is not really an issue, since Canada 
would never deny entry to one of its allies or a reputable shipping 
company. In 1969, then-Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared that 
“to close off those waters and to deny passage to all foreign vessels in 
the name of Canadian sovereignty . . . would be as senseless as 
placing barriers across the entrances of Halifax and Vancouver 
harbours.”384  Moreover, Canada and the United States are close 
partners in the shared defence of North America, whether at the level 
of border security, NATO, or the North American Aerospace Defence 
Command (again, with the scope of the latter organization having 
recently been expanded to encompass maritime surveillance, 
including over the Northwest Passage).385 
 Although American officials and academics sometimes express 
sympathy for Canadian concerns about the Northwest Passage, they 
invariably see an insurmountable obstacle to any change in the U.S. 
position that recognizing Canada’s claim could jeopardize U.S. access 
to key waterways in other parts of the world.  The concept of the 
freedom of the seas and the strategic mobility it provides has long 
been the cornerstone of American policy.  The worry is that, if the 
United States “gives in” over the Passage, countries bordering other 
straits and channels will feel justified in arbitrarily imposing their 
own conditions and requirements for navigation.386  In other words, 
saying “yes” to Canada could create a dangerous precedent. 
                                                                                                                      
 384. Suzanne Lalonde, Artic Waters: Cooperation or Conflict?, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Arctic+waters:+cooperation+or+conflict%3F-
a0185210944 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (quoting HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 39 
(statement of Prime Minister Trudeau Oct. 24, 1969)). Again, in its response to the 
U.S. diplomatic note in 1970, the Canadian government reiterated “its determination 
to open up the Northwest Passage to safe navigation for the shipping of all nations, 
subject, however, to necessary conditions required to protect the delicate ecological 
balance of the Canadian Arctic.” Id. (quoting HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 39 
(statement of Prime Minister Trudeau (Oct. 24, 1969)). 
 385. Agreement on the North American Aerospace Defense Command, supra 
note 330; see supra text accompanying note 330. 
 386. See J.L. Granastein, Does the Northwest Passage Still Matter?, WESTERN 
STANDARD CA, Jan. 12, 2009, available at http://www.westernstandard.ca/website/ 
article.php?id= 2948&start=0 (“To concede that Canada controls it can have 
implications on the other side of the globe, and seafaring states are fearful of a 
precedent that might let less-responsible nations than Canada close off or seek to 
exercise control over international sea routes.”).   
1204  VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 42:1133 
 
A. The Effect of Recognizing Canada’s Claim  
 Although the fear that recognizing Canada’s claim would create 
a dangerous precedent is understandable, it is misplaced.  The 
Canadian position does not seek to create an exception to the 
international straits regime.  Rather, the position is that the 
Northwest Passage is not and has never been an international strait. 
As we demonstrated above, the criteria set out in the Corfu Channel 
Case would seem to support this claim, given the paucity of non-
consensual voyages to date.387 
 Alternatively, the Northwest Passage is readily distinguishable 
from most real or potential international straits elsewhere because of 
the historic presence of thick, hard multi-year ice.  As was explained 
above, Article 234 of UNCLOS recognized this distinguishing 
characteristic; arguably, therefore, both this provision and the 
Northwest Passage were implicitly excluded from the international 
straits regime.388 
 What is more, the statuses of most of the other waterways that 
the United States sought to maintain as international straits have 
now been resolved.  There are, after all, five different legal regimes 
for five different types of straits under UNCLOS.389  Long-standing 
conventions, such as the Montreux Convention with respect to the 
Bosphorous and Dardanelles, which have operated to the mutual 
benefit and satisfaction of all the parties involved, regulate a number 
of important straits.390  As for some of the world’s other important 
straits, some of which have been the source of tension, like the Strait 
of Malacca or Torres Strait, their statuses as international straits 
have been officially recognized in bilateral and multilateral treaties.  
One of the most fundamental precepts of international law, pacta 
sunt servanda, guarantees that the legal rights and obligations under 
such international agreements must be respected.391  
 A bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States 
could not destabilize these other treaty regimes.  To the contrary, a 
bilateral Canada–U.S. agreement, especially if followed by a dozen or 
more identical bilateral agreements between Canada and other allies, 
would at least partly remove the Northwest Passage from the realm 
of customary international law and subject it to a new sui generis 
regime.  A bilateral treaty could even explicitly foresee its use as a 
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template for identical or similar bilateral treaties between one of the 
parties and another state or states—just as was done in the ship 
boarding treaty concluded between the United States and Liberia as 
part of the Proliferation Security Initiative.392 
 Finally, the sheer volume of maritime traffic in these other 
waterways guarantees their subjection to the right of transit passage, 
regardless of what transpires in Canada’s North. 
 In reality, the resolution of the Northwest Passage dispute has 
possible consequences for the status of only one other waterway: the 
Northern Sea Route.  However, ice conditions are changing so quickly 
on the Russian side of the Arctic Ocean that any ship wanting to sail 
along the northern coast of Russia will soon, if not already, be able to 
sail northwards of the Russian islands that create the channels that 
form the Northern Sea Route and fall within the Russian claim.393  
Moreover, it is inconceivable that the United States would physically 
challenge Russia—a nuclear weapon state with considerable 
conventional forces—in that waterway.  For these reasons, 
Washington has to ask itself whether maintaining a legal position of 
no real utility along the northern coast of Russia is worth the security 
risk, from non-state actors, that will likely arise along the northern 
coast of its own continent if the Northwest Passage is treated as an 
international strait. 
 The uniqueness of the situation helps explain why former U.S. 
Ambassador Paul Cellucci has called for Washington to recognize 
Ottawa’s claim.394  There is, in fact, nothing for the United States to 
lose and much for it to gain.  Neither the United States nor Canada 
can afford any delay.  Whether we like it or not, the Arctic ice is 
melting quickly; an international shipping route will appear along 
North America’s longest coastline, and a backdoor to the continent 
will suddenly be ajar. 
 The Canadian government, instead of hoping that silence will 
somehow secure its legal position, should be seeking ways to make 
that position work for the United States, other responsible countries, 
and reputable shipping companies.  Cellucci’s request that the State 
Department re-examine the longstanding U.S. position has created 
an opportunity to initiate bilateral negotiations that still could and 
should be seized upon.  However, finding our way to an agreement 
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will also require two separate but related tracks of confidence-
building: on the one hand, a significant strengthening of Canada’s 
policing, search-and-rescue, icebreaking, and other capabilities along 
the Northwest Passage; and on the other hand, improved cooperation 
between the two countries with respect to the challenges posed by 
shipping across the North.  All of which requires coordination based 
on sustained diplomatic engagement. 
XI.   MODEL NEGOTIATION ON NORTHERN WATERS 
 Paul Cellucci might well have been offering to negotiate when, in 
October 2004, he commented that “perhaps when this [the Northwest 
Passage] is brought to the table again, we may have to take another 
look.” 395  Yet the Canadian government seems to have made no effort 
to look beyond the now slightly opened door.  Canada did not step 
forward until August 2007, abruptly and at the highest of levels, 
when Prime Minister Stephen Harper told President George W. Bush 
about Cellucci’s expressed views.396 Without any preparatory 
diplomacy, the news fell on deaf ears. 
 It was in this context that the authors of this Article contacted 
Cellucci and suggested a “model negotiation” to delineate a path for 
official diplomacy.  He agreed, and, on February 18 and 19, 2008, we 
met in the boardroom of the Canadian Section of the International 
Joint Commission in Ottawa.  The venue was chosen for its symbolic 
value, with the IJC representing a century of institutionalized 
bilateral cooperation concerning issues of sovereignty, environmental 
protection, shipping, and water-use along the U.S.–Canada border, 
including in the Great Lakes.397 
 Two teams of non-governmental experts provided backup for 
us.398  Our goal was to discuss issues, identify possible solutions, and 
make joint recommendations—aimed at both governments—
concerning navigation in Northern waters, including but not limited 
to the Northwest Passage. 
 We began by agreeing on the reasons for the urgent need for 
government-to-government talks.  As was explained above, increased 
                                                                                                                      
 395. Id. 
 396. No US-Canada Thaw on Arctic: Officials, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 
20, 2007; Tonda MacCharles & Bruce Campion-Smith, Troops Out by ‘09, Bush Told, 
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 21, 2007, at A1. 
 397. See International Joint Commission, Who We Are, http://www.ijc.org/en/ 
background/ijc_cmi_nature.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (describing the role of the 
International Joint Commission). 
 398. See Who Owns the Arctic?, Model Negotiation on Northern Waters, Feb. 19, 
2008, http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/model-negotiation-on-northern-waters.html (last 
visited Oct 9, 2009) (providing a list of all participants). 
2009] Who Controls the Northwest Passage? 1207 
 
northern shipping will bring heightened security risks, ranging from 
drug smuggling and illegal immigration to nuclear trafficking.399  
There will also be greater environmental risks, most notably with 
respect to oil spills.400  We also agreed that the long history of U.S.–
Canada cooperation in the Arctic indicates the potential for bilateral 
agreement.  So too does the history of cooperation on shipping 
through other waters under national jurisdiction, including the St. 
Lawrence Seaway, the Great Lakes, and the Juan de Fuca region 
between Vancouver Island and Washington State.  This potential 
became even clearer by the end of the day-and-a-half long exercise, 
when we agreed on nine concrete recommendations.401 
 Our first recommendation was that the United States and 
Canada collaborate in developing parallel rules, standards, and 
cooperative enforcement mechanisms for notification and interdiction 
zones in the northern waters of both Alaska and Canada.  This 
recommendation would see the United States adopt a mandatory 
Arctic shipping registration scheme that would protect, among other 
things, the western approaches of the Northwest Passage, thus 
keeping suspect vessels at bay and alerting Canada about foreign 
ships headed its way.  It would also enable Canada to change its 
current voluntary Arctic shipping registration system (NORDREG) 
into a mandatory scheme without fear of eliciting an American 
protest.402 
 Second, we recommended that the United States and Canada 
share maritime surveillance in northern waters and cooperatively 
develop further surveillance capabilities. This recommendation is 
consistent with the May 2006 expansion of the functions of the North 
American Aerospace Defence Command to include surveillance over 
maritime approaches and “internal waterways.”403  
 Third, we recommended that the two countries build on Canada’s 
already strict Arctic marine environmental protection laws by 
developing even more advanced navigation, safety and ship 
construction, and operation standards.  This recommendation accepts 
the legitimacy of the current application of Canada’s Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act to the Northwest Passage and seeks to 
improve upon it, including by promoting the adoption of equally strict 
rules in the waters north of Alaska.404 
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 Fourth, we recommended that the United States and Canada 
cooperate on the establishment of shipping lanes, traffic management 
schemes, and oil spill response plans for the northern waters of both 
Alaska and Canada.  Cooperative oil spill response plans already 
exists for the Great Lakes, Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, Dixon 
Entrance and Beaufort Sea,405 but planning for cooperative responses 
to emergencies makes sense across the entire northern coast of North 
America, since it is a given that assets and personnel will be 
requested and shared in any serious emergency.  Of course, such 
planning does not infringe on the sovereignty of either state—
providing that consent remains a prerequisite for any deployment of 
assets into foreign waters or onto foreign soil.  The same holds true 
for the establishment of shipping lanes and traffic management 
schemes, where consultation and coordination—for instance, ensuring 
that any shipping lanes in the U.S. portion of the Beaufort Sea meet 
up with the lanes on the Canadian side—is both logical and entirely 
non-threatening.  
 Fifth, we recommended that the two countries cooperatively 
address the immigration and search-and-rescue concerns arising from 
the increasing number of cruise ships in northern waters.  One 
obvious step would be for each country to require the submission of 
full crew and passenger lists as part of a mandatory ship registration 
scheme—consistent with our first recommendation.406  The 
submission of crew and passenger lists would facilitate the full 
enforcement of Canadian immigration laws, including visa and other 
documentary requirements, within the Northwest Passage—to the 
benefit of both countries.  
 Sixth, we recommended that both Canada and the United States 
acquire new icebreakers to replace their ageing coast guard vessels.  
As it happened, just one week after we made this recommendation, 
the Canadian government set aside $720 million for a replacement for 
Canada’s largest and oldest icebreaker, the Louis S. St-Laurent. 407  
In addition, we recommended that the two countries maximize 
burden-sharing opportunities with respect to their icebreakers, 
following the models of a U.S.–Canada icebreaker agreement on the 
Great Lakes and a similar agreement on the resupply of Thule Air 
Base in Greenland.  Indeed, if the countries engaged in more burden-
sharing, the construction of new Canadian icebreakers could reduce 
the number of ships (and thus the expense) involved in recapitalizing 
the U.S. icebreaker fleet and constitute a tacit recognition of 
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Canada’s willingness and competence to manage the Northwest 
Passage and other northern waters. 
 Seventh, we recommended that the two countries develop safety 
infrastructure, including navigation aids and perhaps even new port 
facilities in support of northern shipping.  This recommendation, 
again, is aimed at promoting U.S. action in the waters north of 
Alaska that mirrors and supports Canadian action in the Northwest 
Passage.  For though the burden would fall heaviest on Canada, the 
provision of a safe and economically efficient shipping route through 
the archipelago—complete with navigation aids, detailed charts, fast 
and reliable search and rescue, ports of haven, and perhaps even 
icebreaking for convoys of cargo vessels—would go a long way to 
securing political and eventually legal support for Canada’s claim. 
 Eighth, we recommended that Canada and the United States 
make maximum use of the considerable legal powers they already 
possess over vessels, either sailing to or from Canadian or U.S. ports 
or registered in one or the other country.  This, indeed, has been the 
focus of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the American-led 
endeavour which has led sixty countries (including Canada) to 
exercise their existing rights within their ports, territorial seas, and 
on ships carrying their flags to prevent the use of the high seas for 
proliferation purposes.408  Most of the cargo vessels using the 
Northwest Passage will begin or end their voyages in Canadian or 
U.S. ports, and some will be registered in one or the other country. 
Instead of exercising these legal powers solely for anti-proliferation 
purposes, port state and flag state rights should also be put to use in 
ensuring that vessels in the Northwest Passage and north of Alaska 
meet and exceed the environmental, safety, and security standards 
required under Canadian and U.S. law. 
 Ninth, we recommended the creation of a U.S.–Canada Arctic 
Navigation Commission to promote dialogue, conduct studies, and 
make policy proposals on matters of navigation, environmental 
protection, security, safety, and sustainable economic development.  
Like the International Joint Commission, this would be a purely 
recommendatory body, though it could be granted an ad hoc 
arbitration role if and when the two governments desired. 
 We did try, during the opening phase of the model negotiation, to 
achieve a workable resolution of the dispute over the legal status of 
the Northwest Passage.  It soon became clear that this would take 
longer than the day and a half available to us, which is why we 
decided to focus on other opportunities for cooperation that could then 
act as confidence-building steps towards that further goal.  However, 
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we were able to agree that the U.S. government should examine the 
arguments in favor of recognizing Canada’s legal position.  
 The consequences of climate change in the Northwest Passage 
clearly require serious attention, increased cooperation, and, 
ultimately, legal reconciliation between North America’s two Arctic 
countries.  Our model negotiation demonstrated the potential for 
constructive engagement between Canadians and Americans on this 
important issue. Protecting Canada’s interests in the Northwest 
Passage—and the interests of other responsible states and reputable 
shipping companies—requires a multifaceted approach. We need to 
invest in infrastructure and enforcement capabilities, reach out to 
other countries diplomatically, identify common concerns, and use 
international law in support of imaginative, workable solutions.  With 
the ice disappearing quickly, agreeing to disagree is no longer a viable 
policy for either Canada or the United States. 
